Relief from Deportation: An Unnecessary Battle by Chapman, Christen
Loyola Marymount University and Loyola Law School
Digital Commons at Loyola Marymount
University and Loyola Law School
Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review Law Reviews
6-1-2011
Relief from Deportation: An Unnecessary Battle
Christen Chapman
Loyola Law School, Los Angeles
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews at Digital Commons @ Loyola Marymount University and Loyola Law
School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons@Loyola
Marymount University and Loyola Law School. For more information, please contact digitalcommons@lmu.edu.
Recommended Citation





RELIEF FROM DEPORTATION:  
AN UNNECESSARY BATTLE 
Christen Chapman* 
A removal hearing in immigration court focuses on two predominant 
issues—whether the noncitizen is deportable and whether the noncitizen 
should be granted relief from a deportation order. Because it is 
relatively easy for the government to prove deportability, most removal 
hearings turn on the noncitizen’s application for relief. Currently, an 
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) attorney serves as a 
relentless adversary throughout the removal process, even though few 
noncitizens are represented by counsel. Although the entire removal 
hearing lacks the elements that are essential to a fair adversarial 
proceeding, the ICE attorney’s participation in initially establishing a 
noncitizen’s removability is arguably justified by the government’s 
immigration-enforcement objectives. This justification does not, 
however, extend to the application-for-relief stage, where the focus is 
on granting mercy, not on whether immigration laws have been 
violated. Allowing noncitizens to apply for relief from a deportation 
order reflects Congress’s acknowledgment that deportation is too harsh 
a sanction to be imposed in every situation. These twin deficiencies—
lack of procedural safeguards and lack of a legitimate governmental 
interest—combine to produce a relief hearing that violates noncitizens’ 
procedural due process rights. This Article argues that immigration 
courts should shift to a nonadversarial model at the relief stage of 
removal hearings. In a nonadversarial relief stage, the ICE attorney 
would withdraw and the immigration judge would adopt an 
inquisitorial role. Such a shift would provide noncitizens with an 
opportunity to present their applications for relief under procedures 
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that comport with the Due Process Clause, accommodate the 
government’s immigration enforcement goals, and impose insubstantial 
administrative costs on the immigration court system. 
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Whoever baptized the continental system as “inquisitorial” 
did a disservice to American legal thought. Call it 
“investigatory” and the pejorative connotation fades away. 
Use of the investigatory system should not be viewed as a 
lessening of protection to the individual; if properly 
applied, it could well result in more. 
—Judge Henry J. Friendly1 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Judge Friendly aptly identified America’s distaste for the 
inquisitorial system. Americans tend to equate inquisitorial systems 
with coercive interrogation, torture, unbridled search, secrecy, 
unduly efficient crime control, and dictatorial government.2 Even our 
Supreme Court justices have defined our own adversarial criminal-
adjudication system in terms of anti-inquisitorial norms.3 Yet the 
adversarial model of justice is not always the best-suited forum for 
fair and efficient adjudications. The adversarial system is particularly 
ill suited to adjudicate a noncitizen’s application for relief from a 
deportation order in immigration court.4 
Acknowledging that deportation is too harsh a sanction to 
impose in every situation, Congress has provided noncitizens with 
the ability to apply for relief from a deportation order. For instance, a 
 
 1. Henry J. Friendly, Some Kind of Hearing, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1267, 1290 (1975). 
 2. Marvin E. Frankel, The Search for Truth: An Umpireal View, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1031, 
1053 (1975); Abraham S. Goldstein, Reflections on Two Models: Inquisitorial Themes in 
American Criminal Procedure, 26 STAN. L. REV. 1009, 1018 (1974). 
 3. David Alan Sklansky, Anti-Inquisitorialism, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1634, 1636 (2009). 
 4. This Article uses the term “noncitizen” to serve as the functional equivalent of the term 
“alien” as defined by the Immigration and Nationality Act. The term “alien” means “any person 
not a citizen or national of the United States.” 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(3) (2006). Advocates for 
immigration reform argue against using the terms alien or illegal because those terms allow the 
American society to distance the noncitizen from the citizen and thus justify the disparaging 
treatment of noncitizens. See Kevin R. Johnson, “Aliens” and the U.S. Immigration Laws: The 
Social and Legal Construction of Nonpersons, 28 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 263, 273 (1997) 
(“The term alien serves as a device that intellectually legitimizes the mistreatment of noncitizens 
and helps to mask human suffering.”); see also Carachuri-Rosendo v. Holder, 130 S. Ct. 2577, 
2583 (2010) (writing for the majority, Justice Stevens uses the term noncitizen in place of alien 
when discussing immigration statutes); NAHJ Urges News Media to Stop Using Dehumanizing 
Terms When Covering Immigration, NAT’L ASS’N OF HISPANIC JOURNALISTS, 
http://www.nahj.org/nahjnews/articles/2006/March/immigrationcoverage.shtml (last visited 
Mar. 18, 2011) (calling on American news media to “use accurate terminology in its coverage of 
immigration and to stop dehumanizing undocumented immigrants”). 
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noncitizen may obtain such relief by establishing that he or she faces 
persecution in his or her home country or has created sufficient 
community ties in the United States that deportation would result in 
exceptional and extremely unusual hardship. However, in order to 
obtain this relief, the noncitizen must face a powerful and often 
relentless adversary: the Immigration and Customs Enforcement 
(ICE) attorney. 
In the immigration court system, removal hearings are used to 
determine both whether the noncitizen is deportable and whether the 
noncitizen should be granted relief. As these hearings have become 
increasingly adversarial, the immigration court system has failed to 
adopt all of the elements that are essential in creating a successful 
adversarial model. Although the entire removal hearing lacks the 
elements essential to a fair adversarial proceeding, the ICE attorney’s 
role in establishing the noncitizen’s initial removability is arguably 
justified by the government’s enforcement objectives. Yet, this 
justification does not stretch to the relief stage of the removal 
hearing. These twin deficiencies—lack of procedural safeguards and 
lack of a legitimate governmental interest—combine to produce a 
relief-stage hearing that violates noncitizens’ procedural due process 
rights by depriving noncitizens of the opportunity to effectively 
present their applications for relief in a meaningful manner. 
Rather than reform the current adversarial structure by adding 
the missing adversarial elements, the government should shift the 
relief stage of the removal hearing to a nonadversarial-investigatory 
model. A nonadversarial hearing is a preferable alternative because it 
would better address the type of determination that is the subject of 
the relief stage—whether discretion should be exercised in the 
noncitizen’s favor—and it would create less financial strain on the 
government than would a corps of government-subsidized attorneys 
for noncitizens. A nonadversarial hearing—where the ICE attorney is 
absent and the immigration judge embraces the role of an 
inquisitorial judge—would provide noncitizens with an opportunity 
to present their applications for relief under procedures that comport 
with the Due Process Clause, while it would still accommodate the 
cross-purposes of the immigration enforcement goals and the 
immigration relief goals of the immigration court system. 
Part II provides an overview of the adversarial-inquisitorial 
dichotomy, the immigration court system’s progression to an 
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adversarial structure, and the current adversarial immigration court 
system, with a focus on two predominant types of relief from 
deportation—asylum and cancellation of removal. Part III argues that 
the current adversarial structure of the relief stage of the removal 
hearing is fundamentally flawed because it lacks essential procedural 
and evidentiary safeguards, and it violates noncitizens’ procedural 
due process rights. Part IV articulates what a nonadversarial relief 
hearing would look like, explains how shifting to a nonadversarial 
relief hearing could be achieved without undue burden on the 
government, and addresses possible criticisms of encouraging 
immigration judges to fully embrace an inquisitorial role. 
II.  BACKGROUND 
Few legal systems are purely adversarial or inquisitorial,5 but 
removal hearings, including applications for relief from removal, fall 
on the adversarial side of the spectrum. To appreciate the benefits of 
an alternative approach, both a familiarity with the complete removal 
scheme and a basic understanding of the differences between the 
adversarial and inquisitorial models of justice are necessary. 
A.  Adversarial Versus Inquisitorial 
In appreciating the foundation of each model, it is helpful to 
look at the adversarial and inquisitorial systems as distinct models of 
justice, despite the fact that, in practice, they do not operate in 
isolation of one another. The adversarial and inquisitorial models 
have different loci of control. In an adversarial model, the opposing 
parties control the case. The parties zealously advocate for their 
respective positions through the evidence that they present, the 
witnesses that they examine, and the legal issues that they shape.6 
The judge plays a neutral role—resolving legal issues that the parties 
identify, ruling on the admissibility of evidence that the parties 
present, and, when there is no jury, deciding the outcome of the 
 
 5. Frankel, supra note 2, at 1053; see also Amalia D. Kessler, Our Inquisitorial Tradition: 
Equity Procedure, Due Process, and the Search for an Alternative to the Adversarial, 90 
CORNELL L. REV. 1181, 1187 & n.23 (2005) (noting that even largely adversarial legal systems 
provide for judicial involvement in assisting parties in gathering evidence, and, as a result, they 
contain at least some inquisitorial elements). 
 6. Sharon Finegan, Pro Se Criminal Trials and the Merging of Inquisitorial and 
Adversarial Systems of Justice, 58 CATH. U. L. REV. 445, 472–73 (2009); Goldstein, supra note 
2, at 1016–17. 
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factual contest between the parties.7 The rationale behind party 
control is that zealous competition between two opposing parties will 
provide the adjudicator with the most persuasive evidence and 
arguments from each side of a case.8 
In contrast, the judiciary, rather than opposing parties, controls 
the inquisitorial system.9 The judiciary, whether through the 
presiding judge or investigating magistrate, is charged with 
conducting investigations, initiating cases, determining the issues, 
and controlling the presentation of evidence.10 Thus, the inquisitorial 
model is not dependent on the parties’ presentation of evidence or on 
their strategic decisions. Rather, the judiciary guides the process, and 
the parties assist the judge along the path to final resolution.11 
Because the adversarial model is a contest between two zealous 
opponents, there is heavy emphasis on strict compliance with 
procedural rules.12 For example, in American adversarial criminal 
proceedings where the power and resources of the government 
greatly outweigh those of criminal defendants, procedural 
safeguards, such as strict rules of evidence and a high burden of 
proof on the government, exist to level the contest between the two 
 
 7. Goldstein, supra note 2, at 1016–17; Russell G. Pearce, Redressing Inequality in the 
Market for Justice: Why Access to Lawyers Will Never Solve the Problem and Why Rethinking 
the Role of Judges Will Help, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 969, 970–71 (2004). When a jury is present, 
the role of the judge remains the same, resolving legal issues and ruling on evidence 
admissibility; however, instead of deciding the factual contest of the case, the judge advises the 
jury on the applicable law, and the jury is charged with deciding the factual contest. Goldstein, 
supra note 2, at 1016–17. 
 8. STEPHAN LANDSMAN, READINGS ON ADVERSARIAL JUSTICE: THE AMERICAN 
APPROACH TO ADJUDICATION 2 (1988); Jeffrey S. Wolfe & Lisa B. Proszek, Interaction 
Dynamics in Federal Administrative Decision Making: The Role of the Inquisitorial Judge and 
the Adversarial Lawyer, 33 TULSA L.J. 293, 309 (1997). 
 9. Goldstein, supra note 2, at 1018–19. 
 10. Pearce, supra note 7, at 971; see also Goldstein, supra note 2, at 1018 (discussing how 
different countries delegate authority of the inquisitorial role). For example, the Soviet Union 
employed a public prosecutor to fill much of the inquisitorial role, while in French criminal 
proceedings, the investigating and presiding judge are the central inquisitorial figures. Goldstein, 
supra note 2, at 1018.  
 11. Pearce, supra note 7, at 970–71; Kent Roach, Wrongful Convictions: Adversarial and 
Inquisitorial Themes, 35 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 387, 424 (2010). The party-control nature 
of the adversarial model has been characterized as reflecting a more laissez-faire and reactive 
state. Roach, supra at 398. In contrast, the inquisitorial model reflects a more proactive and 
hierarchical vision of the state. Id. 
 12. Finegan, supra note 6, at 493. 
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parties.13 In contrast, since the outcome in an inquisitorial model is 
not dependent on the competitiveness of the opposing parties, there 
is not the same need for the rigid structure of the adversarial model.14 
To illustrate, in the French inquisitorial system, the judge is not 
inhibited by strict evidentiary rules, and the state has no explicit 
burden of proof or persuasion.15 In the French system, gathered 
evidence is compiled into a file, or “dossier,” and given to the 
presiding judge at the start of the trial process.16 Providing the judge 
with information at the start of trial is different from what occurs in 
the American adversarial system, where the judge usually begins the 
trial process as a blank slate, and the parties, including the 
government, must first overcome procedural and evidentiary hurdles 
to present evidence to the judge.17 
Inquisitorial justice is not just confined to Europe. The United 
States employs the inquisitorial model in some administrative 
contexts, the most prominent being Social Security disability 
appeals.18 When the Social Security Administration (SSA) denies a 
person’s application for disability benefits, the applicant is entitled to 
a hearing before an administrative law judge (ALJ).19 The hearing is 
nonadversarial.20 The applicant may be represented by counsel and 
there is no government representative contesting the applicant’s 
appeal.21 
 
 13. Sean Doran et al., Rethinking Adversariness in Nonjury Criminal Trials, 23 AM. J. CRIM. 
L. 1, 23–24 (1995). 
 14. Finegan, supra note 6, at 467–68. 
 15. Id. at 468. 
 16. Goldstein, supra note 2, at 1018–19. 
 17. Doran et al., supra note 13, at 21; see also Frankel, supra note 2, at 1053 (raising the 
question of “whether the virginally ignorant judge is always to be preferred to one with an 
investigative file”). 
 18. The disability benefits system of the Department of Veterans Affairs is also 
nonadversarial. See Hodge v. West, 155 F.3d 1356, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (describing “the 
historically nonadversarial system of awarding benefits to veterans”). 
 19. 20 C.F.R. § 404.900(a) (2010) (providing an explanation of the administrative review 
process). 
 20. Id. § 404.900(b) (describing the nature of the administrative review process—the SSA 
“conduct[s] the administrative review process in an informal, nonadversary manner”). But see 
Robert E. Rains, Professional Responsibility and Social Security Representation: The Myth of the 
State-Bar Bar to Compliance with the Federal Rules on Production of Adverse Evidence, 92 
CORNELL L. REV. 363, 364 (2007) (speculating whether it is actually a nonadversarial 
proceeding). 
 21. Rains, supra note 20, at 364. 
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The Supreme Court has characterized the ALJ who presides 
over the hearing as wearing three hats—claimant representative, 
government representative, and neutral decider.22 The ALJ’s role 
emulates that of the inquisitorial judge in continental countries.23 The 
Supreme Court approved the hearing’s inquisitorial procedures, 
which include relaxed rules of evidence along with the inquisitorial 
ALJ, “so long as the procedures are fundamentally fair.”24 The Court 
also concluded that the procedures appropriately fulfilled Congress’s 
intent to keep the hearing informal and understandable to the 
layman.25 Keeping the procedures informal and accessible to 
claimants who are not represented by counsel reflects the nature of 
the SSA as a social agent charged with ensuring that the SSA’s 
program goals are fulfilled.26 
B.  History of the Removal Hearing:  
A Shift from Inquisitorial to Adversarial 
Similar to the ALJs in the SSA disability appeals process, the 
predecessors to removal hearings were nonadversarial at their 
inception.27 During the first part of the twentieth century, in simple 
cases, a single immigration officer would play the role of 
investigator, government representative, and adjudicator.28 As cases 
became more complicated, sometimes one immigration officer would 
present the government’s case while a different immigration officer 
served as the adjudicator.29 But the roles of government investigator 
and adjudicator were not formally separate—one day an immigration 
officer would investigate a case, and the next day that same officer 
 
 22. Paul R. Verkuil, The Emerging Concept of Administrative Procedure, 78 COLUM. L. 
REV. 258, 286 (1978) (referring to the Supreme Court case Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389 
(1971)). 
 23. Id. 
 24. Richardson, 402 U.S. at 400–01. 
 25. Id.; see also Verkuil, supra note 22, at 270 (discussing a 1940 statement issued by the 
Social Security Board that “discussed the values to be achieved in an administrative hearing in 
terms of ‘simplicity and informality’ as well as ‘accuracy and fairness’”). 
 26. Richardson, 402 U.S. at 400–01. 
 27. See Dory M. Durham, The Once and Future Judge: The Rise and Fall (and Rise?) of 
Independence in U.S. Immigration Courts, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 655, 661–63 (2006) 
(discussing the way immigration cases were adjudicated under the Immigration Acts of 1907 and 
1917). 
 28. Id. at 663–64. 
 29. Id. at 664. 
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might adjudicate the case that he or she was investigating.30 In 1952, 
when Congress passed the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA),31 
the roles of investigating officer and adjudicator became distinct, but 
the INA did not—and still does not—mandate that an investigating 
officer be present during deportation proceedings.32 The original 
version of the INA assigned separate duties to “immigration officers” 
and “special inquiry officers.”33 The special inquiry officer occupied 
the position that has become the modern immigration judge.34 The 
INA does not define the position of immigration officer with any 
particularity,35 and the immigration officer responsible for presenting 
the government’s case against the noncitizen has evolved through 
department regulation and practice.36 
In 1956, the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS)—the 
former governmental agency charged with enforcing immigration 
laws—implemented a departmental policy to have another 
immigration officer, aside from the adjudicating officer, present to 
introduce the government’s case against the noncitizen and carry out 
cross-examination in every case in which the noncitizen contested 
his or her deportability.37 In 1962, the INS developed a specialized 
staff of trial attorneys to perform this function.38 This specialized 
staff carried over to the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) 
 
 30. During this same period, however, there was an Immigration and Naturalization Service 
(INS) policy in place that provided that the same officer who investigated the noncitizen’s case 
could only adjudicate the case if the noncitizen consented. Id. at 663–64. However, Professor 
Durham notes that it was doubtful that a noncitizen ever refused to consent given the existence of 
natural human eagerness to please the person who was about to decide his or her fate. Id. at 664 
n.38. 
 31. The Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 was a comprehensive statute passed by 
Congress governing immigration. Id. at 667. When the INA was passed, it repealed all previous 
immigration statutes; the INA, as amended, continues to govern immigration today. Id. at 667 
n.57. 
 32. See THOMAS A. ALEINIKOFF ET AL., IMMIGRATION PROCESS AND POLICY 278 (6th ed. 
2008) (explaining that the INA provided the Attorney General with the option of having another 
immigration officer present during deportation proceedings). 
 33. Durham, supra note 27, at 668. 
 34. Id. 
 35. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(18) (2006) (defining the term “immigration officer” as “any 
employee or class of employees of the Service or of the United States designated by the Attorney 
General, individually or by regulation, to perform the functions of an immigration officer 
specified by this chapter or any section of this title”). 
 36. Durham, supra note 27, at 673. 
 37. ALEINIKOFF ET AL., supra note 32, at 278–79. 
 38. Id. at 279. 
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when it replaced INS,39 and the staff is now housed within ICE’s 
Office of the Principal Legal Advisor (OPLA).40 Today, ICE 
attorneys appear on behalf of the government in all proceedings 
before immigration judges, even hearings where deportability and 
inadmissibility are not contested.41 
In conclusion, a prosecuting government attorney was not 
originally required and still is not statutorily required during removal 
hearings, including during the relief stage. Nonetheless, the ICE 
attorney remains a staple of the immigration court system, which has 
evolved into a largely adversarial system. 
C.  The Path to Deportation or  
Relief Through the Immigration Courts 
A noncitizen’s path through the immigration court system 
begins with a Notice to Appear (NTA).42 After the noncitizen is 
served with an NTA, the noncitizen is placed in removal 
proceedings, which consist of hearings—sometimes one, sometimes 
several—in front of an immigration judge, where the noncitizen is 
opposed by an ICE attorney “with [his or her] awesome power, 
extensive institutional experience, and sophisticated understanding of 
the law.”43 While two levels of appellate review may follow the 
immigration judge’s ruling on the noncitizen’s deportability or 
 
 39. In response to the September 11th attacks, Congress passed the Homeland Security Act, 
which abolished the INS and transferred its functions to the newly created DHS. Id. at 269. In 
transferring INS’s functions to DHS, then-President George W. Bush restructured the way that 
immigration functions were carried out and created three DHS units with immigration 
responsibilities—Customs and Border Patrol (CBP), ICE, and Citizenship and Immigration 
Services (USCIS). Id. at 269–70. 
 40. About ICE: Office of the Principal Legal Advisor, U.S. IMMIGRATION & CUSTOMS 
ENFORCEMENT, http://www.ice.gov/about/offices/leadership/opla/ (last visited Mar. 25, 2011). 
Prosecuting removal hearings is just one of many divisions of OPLA; other areas of practice 
include serving as a legal advisor to other DHS branches and assisting the United States 
Attorney’s office in criminal immigration cases. Id. 
 41. ALEINIKOFF ET AL., supra note 32, at 279. 
 42. The formal removal system through the immigration courts is just one of many ways in 
which the government may deport noncitizens. See generally Jill E. Family, A Broader View of 
the Immigration Adjudication Problem, 23 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 595, 611–47 (2009) (providing a 
detailed analysis of the methods, aside from removal hearings, that the government uses to 
remove noncitizens). 
 43. Jennifer L. Colyer et al., The Representational and Counseling Needs of the Immigrant 
Poor, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 461, 464 (2009). 
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inadmissibility, there is generally no review available for denials of 
relief.44 
1.  The NTA 
An officer from any division of DHS may issue an NTA to a 
person if the officer believes that the person is inadmissible45 or 
deportable46 as defined by the INA. Noncitizens come into contact 
with DHS officers in a variety of ways—at a point of entry into the 
country, through referral to the DHS by local law enforcement after 
an arrest or criminal conviction, during a worksite raid, or during the 
process of applying for certain immigration benefits with DHS.47 
An NTA states the noncitizen’s alleged immigration violation 
(overstaying a visa, for example), the time and place of the 
noncitizen’s first hearing, the noncitizen’s right to hire counsel, and 
the consequences for failing to appear.48 After serving the NTA, the 
DHS officer has the authority to either cancel it or file it with the 
immigration court.49 If the DHS officer files the NTA, the noncitizen 
must appear before an immigration judge at a removal hearing. 
2.  The Removal Hearing 
The Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR), an 
agency within the Department of Justice (DOJ), manages the 
immigration courts. Removal hearings50 are civil administrative 
 
 44. See id. 
 45. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a) (2006) (defining the classes of noncitizens ineligible for visas or 
admission). 
 46. Id. § 1227(a) (2006) (defining the classes of deportable noncitizens). 
 47. See DANIEL KANSTROOM, DEPORTATION NATION: OUTSIDERS IN AMERICAN HISTORY 
4 (2007) (discussing ways that noncitizens come into contact with DHS officers). For instance, a 
man was served with an NTA and arrested while he was in an immigration office translating for a 
friend because an official in the office suspected that the man was not legally in the United States. 
Marine’s Immigrant Father Faces Deportation, THE SEATTLE TIMES (Dec. 30, 2010, 8:54 AM), 
http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/nationworld/2013803933_apusdeportationappeal.html. 
 48. 8 U.S.C. § 1229(a)(1)(A)–(G) (2006). 
 49. See ALEINIKOFF ET AL., supra note 32, at 776 (discussing that the government may 
decide to forgo removal proceedings against a noncitizen whom it has identified, possibly due to 
resource limitations or judgments about the seriousness of the immigration violations); see also 
Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia, The Role of Prosecutorial Discretion in Immigration Law, 9 CONN. 
PUB. INT. L.J. 243, 298 (2010) (discussing how the decision to exercise discretion places the 
noncitizen in limbo, vulnerable to future removal proceedings and usually unable to travel or 
work). 
 50. Before 1996, noncitizens were removed from the United States in two different types of 
proceedings—exclusion hearings and deportation hearings. Stephen H. Legomsky, Restructuring 
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proceedings over which an immigration judge presides. In 
conducting the removal proceedings, the immigration judge has the 
authority to interrogate, examine, and cross-examine the noncitizen 
and any witnesses.51 During removal hearings, the ICE attorney 
represents the government. Noncitizens have the right to be 
represented during removal hearings, but since removal hearings are 
civil proceedings, noncitizens do not have the right to government-
appointed counsel under the Sixth Amendment.52 Removal hearings 
concentrate on two issues—whether the noncitizen is removable and, 
if so, whether the noncitizen should be granted relief from removal.53 
a.  Establishing removability 
Removal hearings may consist of a single hearing that resolves 
the noncitizen’s case,54 but they are usually divided into two separate 
stages: a master calendar hearing and an individual merits hearing.55 
The master calendar hearing is similar to a criminal arraignment; 
during the master calendar hearing, the immigration judge will 
 
Immigration Adjudication, 59 DUKE L.J. 1635, 1641 (2009). Exclusion hearings were conducted 
to determine whether a noncitizen should be removed from the United States on seeking 
admission, while deportation hearings were conducted to determine whether a noncitizen should 
be removed from the United States after having already entered the country. Id. The Illegal 
Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 combined these two hearings into 
a unitary removal hearing. Id. 
 51. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(1). The immigration judge also has a duty to develop a full record, 
especially in the cases where a noncitizen is not represented by counsel. Al Khouri v. Ashcroft, 
362 F.3d 461, 464–65 (8th Cir. 2004). 
 52. Stephen H. Legomsky, The New Path of Immigration Law: Asymmetric Incorporation of 
Criminal Justice Norms, 64 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 469, 516 n.229 (2007); Peter L. Markowitz, 
Deportation is Different, CARDOZO LEGAL STUDIES RESEARCH PAPER NO. 308, 1, 16 n.65 (Aug. 
2010), available at http://www.cardozo.yu.edu/MemberContentDisplay.aspx?ccmd= 
ContentDisplay&ucmd=UserDisplay&userid=74&contentid=17090&folderid=2184. But see 
Aguilera-Enriquez v. I.N.S., 516 F.2d 565, 568 n.3 (6th Cir. 1975) (holding that there may be a 
right to counsel at the government’s expense under the Fifth Amendment). However, there is no 
published opinion that has provided a noncitizen with government appointed counsel under the 
test articulated in Aguilera-Enriquez. ALEINIKOFF ET AL., supra note 32, at 1034. 
 53. ALEINIKOFF ET AL., supra note 32, at 775, 1028. 
 54. A noncitizen’s case may be disposed of summarily at the master calendar hearing if 
deportability is clearly shown and there is no relief available to the noncitizen or the noncitizen 
admits the truth of the allegations and seeks voluntary departure. Voluntary departure allows a 
noncitizen to depart from the country at his or her own expense, rather than being removed by a 
formal court order. 8 U.S.C. § 1229c(a)(1). A noncitizen may choose to voluntarily depart 
because a voluntary departure order does not pose the same obstacles to a noncitizen’s return to 
the United States through lawful avenues as does a removal order, which may bar a person from 
returning to the United States for ten years after the removal order. See ALEINIKOFF ET AL., supra 
note 32, at 820–26 (discussing voluntary departure in more detail). 
 55. ALEINIKOFF ET AL., supra note 32, at 1028. 
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inform the noncitizen of his or her alleged immigration violations.56 
If the noncitizen is not represented by counsel, the immigration judge 
will explain the proceedings to the noncitizen and inform the 
noncitizen of his or her right to employ counsel.57 If the noncitizen 
expresses a desire to obtain counsel, the immigration judge will set a 
second master calendar hearing.58 If the noncitizen decides to 
proceed without counsel or has counsel present, the immigration 
judge will then ask the noncitizen to either admit or deny the alleged 
immigration violations.59 
If the noncitizen contests the government’s allegations, then the 
immigration judge will set a date for an individual merits hearing to 
adjudicate the government’s allegations.60 If the noncitizen concedes 
the government’s allegations, the focus will shift to whether the 
noncitizen is eligible for a form of relief. In either situation, the 
immigration judge has a duty to inform the noncitizen of the option 
to apply for relief if the record raises a reasonable possibility that the 
noncitizen is eligible for such relief.61 The immigration judge must 
notify the noncitizen of the type of relief that the noncitizen might 
qualify for and provide the noncitizen an opportunity to develop the 
 
 56. Id.; Interactive Benchbook for Immigration Judges: Introduction to the Master 
Calendar, EXEC. OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION REVIEW, http://www.justice.gov/eoir/vll/benchbook/ 
tools/Purpose%20and%20History%20of%20MC.htm (last visited Feb. 21, 2010) [hereinafter 
Master Calendar]. At this time, the immigration judge will also address any deficiencies in the 
NTA, which the ICE attorney can usually easily correct by lodging the factual allegations in a 
DHS form. Master Calendar, supra. 
 57. ALEINIKOFF ET AL., supra note 32, at 1029; Master Calendar, supra note 56. The 
immigration judge is also required to provide the noncitizen with a list of pro-bono attorneys in 
the area. 8 U.S.C. § 1229(b)(2). Unfortunately, many of the pro-bono offices and attorneys listed 
do not have enough resources to handle all of the requests that they receive. Evelyn H. Cruz, 
Double the Injustice, Twice the Harm: The Impact of the Board of Immigration Appeals’s 
Summary Affirmance Procedures, 16 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 481, 494 (2005); see also Bill Ong 
Hing, Systemic Failure: Mental Illness, Detention, and Deportation, 16 U.C. DAVIS J. INT’L L. & 
POL’Y 341, 380–81 (2010) (discussing how the problem of not enough pro-bono representation is 
amplified when the noncitizen is detained, which is especially worrisome when almost 40 percent 
of the detainees have possible meritorious claims for relief). Also, noncitizens may be represented 
by persons other than certified attorneys. See 8 C.F.R. § 292.1 (2010) (listing the classifications 
of persons who may represent noncitizens in immigration court proceedings). 
 58. Master Calendar, supra note 56. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. 
 61. 8 C.F.R. § 1240.11(a)(2) (2010) (“The immigration judge shall inform the alien of his or 
her apparent eligibility to apply for any of the benefits enumerated in this chapter and shall afford 
the alien an opportunity to make application during the hearing . . . .”). 
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issue.62 At the conclusion of the master calendar hearing, the 
immigration judge sets a date for an individual merits hearing on the 
contested allegations, the noncitizen’s application for relief, or 
both.63 
The individual merits hearing is the trial stage of the removal 
hearing. If the noncitizen contests the government’s allegations, the 
ICE attorney bears the initial burden to prove the noncitizen’s 
inadmissibility or deportability.64 The ICE attorney typically relies on 
documentation that is contained in a noncitizen’s government-
maintained Alien File (“A-file”) to establish inadmissibility or 
deportability.65 For instance, an ICE attorney may prove that a 
noncitizen has overstayed a visa by presenting issuing documents 
containing the visa expiration from the noncitizen’s A-file. Or the 
ICE attorney may establish a noncitizen’s inadmissibility by 
presenting a birth certificate from a foreign country and arguing that 
it belongs to the noncitizen because it bears an age and a name that 
match or closely match those of the noncitizen.66 
Once the ICE attorney and the noncitizen finish presenting their 
evidence and arguments, the immigration judge will deliver a 
decision, either orally or in writing, regarding the noncitizen’s 
inadmissibility or deportability.67 If the immigration judge finds that 
the immigration violations are true, but the noncitizen is eligible for 
relief, the immigration judge may adjudicate the application for relief 
at the same hearing or at another individual merits hearing. 
 
 62. In re Cordova, 22 I. & N. Dec. 966, 970 n.4 (1999). 
 63. Master Calendar, supra note 56. 
 64. 8 C.F.R. § 1240.8(a), (c) (providing the burden of proof that the ICE attorney must 
overcome in establishing inadmissibility and deportability). 
 65. See Master Calendar, supra note 56 (“If there is a denial of a factual allegation or 
charge, the immigration judge should then ask the Government attorney to present evidence on 
the matter. This usually consists of documents, such as the Form I-213 Record of 
Deportable/Inadmissible Alien.”). The A-file is shared by all branches of DHS and contains 
information regarding every transaction involving an individual as he or she passes through the 
U.S. immigration and inspection process. Dent v. Holder, 627 F.3d 365, 368 n.4 (9th Cir. 2010). 
While USCIS is the custodian of the A-file, all three components of DHS create and use A-files. 
Id. at 368. The A-file “contains all the individual’s official record material such as naturalization 
certificates; various forms (and attachments, e.g., photographs), applications and petitions for 
benefits under the immigration and nationality laws, reports of investigations; statements; reports; 
correspondence; and memoranda on each individual for whom INS has created a record under the 
Immigration and Nationality Act.” Id. at 372 (internal citation omitted). 
 66. Corona-Palomera v. I.N.S., 661 F.2d 814, 815–16 (9th Cir. 1981). 
 67. 8 C.F.R. § 1240.13. 
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b.  Applying for relief 
Because it is relatively easy for the government to prove the 
alleged immigration violations, most removal hearings turn on 
noncitizens’ application for relief.68 Allowing a noncitizen to apply 
for relief from removal reflects a decision by Congress that there 
should be some flexibility built into the otherwise strict immigration 
laws.69 The two most commonly requested forms of discretionary 
relief are asylum70 and cancellation of removal.71 Asylum and 
cancellation of removal are both statutorily established and have a 
long history in the United States’ immigration context.72 
 
 68. ALEINIKOFF ET AL., supra note 32, at 775; see also Fact Sheet: EOIR at a Glance, EXEC. 
OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION REVIEW 2 (Dec. 14, 2009), http://www.justice.gov/eoir/press/ 
09/EOIRataGlance121409.pdf (“In most removal proceedings, individuals admit that they are 
removable, but then apply for one or more forms of relief.”). 
 69. See E.P. HUTCHINSON, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF AMERICAN IMMIGRATION POLICY, 
1798–1965, 558–59 (University of Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia 1981) (“It would appear that 
Congress has been aware that strict application of the law could work undue hardship in some 
cases, and thus has inserted certain provisions that can be used to soften the rigor of the law in 
deserving cases.”). 
 70. 8 U.S.C. § 1158 (2006). 
 71. Id. § 1229b (2006). Other types of discretionary relief from a formal removal order 
include restriction on removal, a waiver of a removal ground, adjustment of status, deferred 
enforced departure, temporary protected status, voluntary departure, parole, stay of removal, and 
private bills. See Juliet Stumpf, Fitting Punishment, 66 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1683, 1694–98 
(2009) (presenting a concise discussion of these forms of relief); see also ALEINIKOFF ET AL., 
supra note 32, at 775–827 (providing a more thorough discussion of the different types of relief 
from removal). Two other forms of relief that are not discretionary are withholding of removal 
under the Refugee Act of 1980 and the Convention Against Torture. Won Kidane, Revisiting the 
Rules of Procedure and Evidence Applicable in Adversarial Administrative Deportation 
Proceedings: Lessons from the Department of Labor Rules of Evidence, 57 CATH. U. L. REV. 93, 
133 n.216 (2007). 
 72. Although the current asylum statute did not come into effect until Congress passed the 
Refugee Act of 1980, exempting refugees from the categories of noncitizens that would otherwise 
be inadmissible or deportable has been a consistent part of history dating back to the first federal 
immigration laws. See David A. Martin, Reforming Asylum Adjudication: On Navigating the 
Coast of Bohemia, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 1247, 1257–66 (1990) (providing a brief history of 
American refugee provisions leading to the Refugee Act of 1980). Cancellation of removal, in 
one form or another, has been a part of United States immigration policy dating as far back as 
1798. See HUTCHINSON, supra note 69, at 568–71 (discussing the Congressional policies that 
lead to the suspension-of-deportation provision). Suspension of deportation is the most recent 
predecessor to the current cancellation-of-removal statute. See Margot K. Mendelson, 
Constructing America: Mythmaking in U.S. Immigration Courts, 119 YALE L.J. 1012, 1035–37 
(2010) (explaining the shift from suspension of deportation to the implementation of the 
cancellation of removal statute). 
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i.  Asylum 
Asylum is the most common form of relief that noncitizens 
request.73 Asylum allows a noncitizen to remain in the United States 
if the noncitizen can establish that he or she is a refugee—in other 
words, if he or she suffers from past persecution or a well-founded 
fear of future persecution in his or her home country on account of 
race, religion, nationality, political opinion, or membership in a 
particular social group.74 Asylum does not confer permanent status 
on the noncitizen, but it enables the noncitizen to work in the United 
States and apply for permanent residence.75 
A noncitizen may apply for asylum affirmatively by filing an 
application with the Citizenship and Immigration Services, or 
defensively as a form of relief in a removal hearing.76 Affirmative 
asylum applications are reviewed in a nonadversarial manner by an 
asylum officer trained in human rights law and in refugee law and 
principles.77 If an asylum officer denies a noncitizen’s affirmative 
application, the asylum officer may refer the application, along with 
an NTA, to an immigration court to commence removal 
proceedings.78 
Defensive asylum applications are adjudicated in an adversarial 
style during the relief stage of a removal hearing. The noncitizen 
bears the burden of establishing past persecution or well-founded 
fear of future persecution.79 After the noncitizen presents his or her 
case of past or future fear of persecution, the ICE attorney has the 
opportunity to challenge the noncitizen’s application. In applying for 
asylum, noncitizens are not required to present corroborating 
evidence,80 and in most cases they do not have any because most 
 
 73. EXEC. OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION REVIEW STATISTICAL YEARBOOK: FY 2010, R1, 
available at http://www.justice.gov/eoir/statspub/fy10syb.pdf [hereinafter 2010 STATISTICAL 
YEARBOOK]. 
 74. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A) (2006) (defining refugee for purposes of the INA). The 
asylum statute states that “[t]he burden of proof is on the applicant to establish that the applicant 
is a refugee, within the meaning of section 1101(a)(42)(A) of this title.” Id. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(i). 
 75. Id. § 1158(c) (outlining the details of asylum status); see also id. § 1159 (providing the 
criteria applied to refugees who apply for adjustment of status). 
 76. ALEINIKOFF ET AL., supra note 32, at 850–51. 
 77. 8 C.F.R. §§ 208.9(b), 208.1(b) (2006). 
 78. Id. § 208.14(c)(1). 
 79. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B). 
 80. Id. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(ii). However, in practice, corroborating evidence makes the 
noncitizen’s testimony more credible and, thus, the noncitizen is more likely to succeed. See 
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persons leave their home countries without tangible evidence of past, 
or the possibility of future, persecution.81 Because of this, in an 
asylum application, the noncitizen’s testimony is often the 
foundation of the asylum claim and, therefore, the noncitizen’s 
credibility is a critical factor in the immigration judge’s 
determination.82 In response, the ICE attorney’s main tactic in 
contesting a claim for asylum is to engage in vigorous cross-
examination in order to impeach the noncitizen’s credibility.83 
If the noncitizen survives the ICE attorney’s cross-examination 
and succeeds in establishing past persecution, the ICE attorney can 
still argue against a grant of asylum by proving by a preponderance 
of the evidence that conditions in the noncitizen’s home country have 
undergone fundamental change such that the noncitizen would not 
face future persecution or by proving that relocation to a different 
part of the home country would not subject the noncitizen to future 
persecution.84 In arguing that country conditions have changed, the 
ICE attorney may submit the State Department’s report on the human 
rights conditions of that country85 to the immigration judge.86 To 
illustrate, a successful asylum claim might be based on sexual 
orientation: noncitizens may qualify for asylum by establishing that 
they suffered persecution in their home countries because they are 
 
Kidane, supra note 71, at 133–36 (discussing the use of corroborating evidence in assessing a 
noncitizen’s credibility in adjudicating asylum applications and the implications of the Real Id 
Act of 2005, which amended the credibility determination requirements). 
 81. Jill E. Family, Beyond Decisional Independence: Uncovering Contributors to the 
Immigration Adjudication Crisis, WIDENER LAW SCHOOL LEGAL STUDIES RESEARCH PAPER 
SERIES NO. 10–24, (2010), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id= 
1659704; see also Dawoud v. Gonzales, 424 F.3d 608, 612–13 (7th Cir. 2005) (discussing the 
policy behind permitting reliance solely on credible testimony in asylum applications). 
 82. Bruce J. Einhorn, The Gift of Understanding, 3 ALB. GOV’T L. REV. 149, 152 (2010) 
(“In my experience, and in the frank and frequent conversations I have held with my colleagues 
from the court, the single most significant factor in an IJ’s assessment of an asylum claim is 
credibility.”). 
 83. Family, supra note 81; Deborah E. Anker, Determining Asylum Claims in the United 
States: A Case Study on the Implementation of Legal Norms in an Unstructured Adjudicatory 
Environment, 19 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 433, 493–94 (1992/1993); Kidane, supra note 
71, at 136 (commenting that author once observed an ICE attorney cross-examine a noncitizen for 
over three hours); Martin, supra note 72, at 1308 (noting that ICE attorneys are not expected to 
develop any additional evidence when contesting a noncitizen’s application for asylum). 
 84. 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(1) (2010); see, e.g., Balliu v. Gonzales, 467 F.3d 609, 612 (7th Cir. 
2006). 
 85. The State Department is required to produce annual reports on countries’ human rights 
conditions. See 22 U.S.C. § 2151n(d) (2006). 
 86. Martin, supra note 72, at 1349–50. 
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homosexuals and they have a well-founded fear that such persecution 
will continue if they are forced to return to those countries.87 
ICE attorneys are not required to contest all asylum applications, 
and they can state on the record that the government has no objection 
to a grant of asylum; however, in practice, ICE attorneys most often 
argue for denial.88 
ii.  Cancellation of removal 
Like asylum, cancellation of removal is a form of relief provided 
to noncitizens stemming from humanitarian concerns. Yet, instead of 
addressing human rights violations because of persecution, 
cancellation of removal reflects a policy determination by Congress 
that some noncitizens should be allowed to remain in the United 
States, despite being technically deportable, because they possess 
qualities desirable in residents and because deportation would create 
an exceptional and extremely unusual hardship on the persons whom 
the noncitizen left behind in the United States.89 Cancellation of 
removal either confers or restores Legal Permanent Resident (LPR)90 
status to a noncitizen91 and is therefore the most generous form of 
relief available to a noncitizen.92 Because it is such a generous form 
of relief, cancellation of removal is only available in “truly 
 
 87. See Dan Bilefsky, Gays Seeking Asylum in U.S. Encounter a New Hurdle, N.Y. TIMES, 
Jan. 29, 2011, at A19. Bilefsky also addresses a hurdle facing asylum applicants whose claims of 
persecution are based on their homosexuality, which is that “[j]udges and immigration officials 
are adding a new hurdle in gay asylum cases that an applicant’s homosexuality must be socially 
visible.” Id. 
 88. See Anker, supra note 83, at 436, 492 (reporting that in a 1992 case study, out of 193 
asylum hearings, the ICE attorney adopted an oppositional stance in every case but one); Philip 
G. Schrag, et al., Rejecting Refugees: Homeland Security’s Administration of the One-year Bar to 
Asylum, 52 WM. & MARY L. REV. 651, 661 n.24 (2010) (noting that “in the vast majority of 
cases, DHS attorneys challenge applicants’ corroborating evidence, cross-examine applicants to 
elicit contradictions, argue that applicants do not meet the statutory standards for asylum, and in 
other ways vigorously oppose a grant of asylum, treating asylum applications in immigration 
court like other forms of contested civil or criminal litigation, even when applicants are unable to 
afford or obtain representation”). 
 89. HUTCHINSON, supra note 69, at 558–59, 574. 
 90. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(20) (2006) (“The term ‘lawfully admitted for permanent residence’ 
means the status of having been lawfully accorded the privilege of residing permanently in the 
United States as an immigrant in accordance with the immigration laws, such status not having 
changed.”). 
 91. Id. § 1229b(a), (b). 
 92. Stumpf, supra note 71, at 1695; see also KANSTROOM, supra note 47, at 233 (stating that 
cancellation of removal is a classic example of ultimate discretion within removal proceedings). 
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exceptional” circumstances.93 Additionally, the statutory 
requirements to qualify for cancellation of removal have become 
increasingly stringent over the years.94 
The specific eligibility requirements for cancellation of removal 
depend on the noncitizen’s immigration status. If the noncitizen is an 
LPR, the noncitizen will be eligible for relief if the noncitizen has 
been lawfully admitted for permanent residence for not less than five 
years, has resided in the United States continuously for seven years 
after having been admitted in any status, and has not been convicted 
of an aggravated felony.95 If the noncitizen is not an LPR, the 
eligibility criteria are more rigorous. Relief will only be available to 
a non-LPR if the noncitizen has been physically present in the United 
States continuously for at least ten years; has been a person of good 
moral character96 during such period; has not been convicted of 
certain specified crimes;97 and can establish that removal would 
result in exceptional and extremely unusual hardship to the 
noncitizen’s spouse, parent, or child, if that person is a citizen of the 
United States or a noncitizen who was lawfully admitted for 
permanent residence.98 
Even if the noncitizen meets all of the eligibility requirements, 
the immigration judge is under no duty to cancel removal.99 Professor 
Jill E. Family characterizes this as a negative discretion that is built 
into a system focused on denial.100 Additionally, the exceptional and 
 
 93. See Monreal-Aguinaga, 23 I. & N. Dec. 56, 62 (2001) (quoting the House Conference 
Report on the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigration Responsibility Act of 1996, HR No. 
104-828). 
 94. Mendelson, supra note 72, at 1037 & n.106. 
 95. 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a)(1)–(3). 
 96. See id. § 1101(f) (defining good moral character). For example, a person found to be a 
habitual drunkard is not considered to be someone with good moral character. Id. § 1101(f)(1). 
 97. See id. § 1229b(b)(1)(C) (specifying that disqualifying crimes are offenses under 
8 U.S.C. §§ 1182(a)(2), 1227(a)(2), or 1227(a)(3), which include crimes of moral turpitude, 
aggravated felonies, or crimes related to falsifying immigration documents). This provision also 
provides that a conviction of one of these offenses may not be a disqualifying crime if the 
immigration judge finds that the domestic violence waiver is applicable in the noncitizen’s case. 
Id. 
 98. Id. § 1229b(b)(1)(A)–(D). The statute also provides for special eligibility criteria for 
battered spouses or children applying for cancellation of removal. See id. § 1229b(b)(2). 
 99. Id. § 1229b(a), (b); see also United States ex rel. Hintopoulos v. Shaughnessy, 353 U.S. 
72, 77 (1957) (“Suspension of deportation is a matter of discretion and of administrative grace, 
not mere eligibility; discretion must be exercised even though statutory prerequisites have been 
met.” (footnote omitted)). 
 100. Family, supra note 81. 
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extremely unusual hardship criterion is a very high threshold to meet. 
In one case, for instance, an immigration judge found that 
Mr. Monreal-Aguinaga, a non-LPR, had been in the country for the 
requisite period of time and was of good moral character.101 But in 
spite of the fact that Mr. Monreal-Aguinaga had two United States 
citizen children under age fifteen and parents with LPR status, the 
immigration judge found that Mr. Monreal-Aguinaga’s deportation 
would not create an exceptional and extremely unusual hardship for 
these persons and denied his application for cancellation of 
removal.102 
3.  The Appeals 
There are two levels of appellate review in the immigration 
court system. First, either the noncitizen or the ICE attorney may 
appeal the immigration judge’s decision to the Board of Immigration 
Appeals (BIA),103 the highest administrative body for interpreting 
and applying immigration laws.104 At the second stage, only the 
noncitizen may appeal an adverse BIA decision.105 The U.S. court of 
appeals for the circuit in which the removal hearing was held reviews 
the noncitizen’s appeal.106 
In the last fifteen years, Congress has severely limited the types 
of cases that are reviewable by a federal court.107 Most importantly, 
Congress has pushed discretionary decisions, including relief from 
 
 101. Monreal-Aguinaga, 23 I. & N. Dec. 56, 57 (2001). 
 102. Id. at 57–58. The BIA affirmed the immigration judge’s determination. Id. at 64–65. 
 103. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(b)(3) (2010). 
 104. About: Board of Immigration Appeals, EXEC. OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION REVIEW, 
http://www.justice.gov/eoir/biainfo.htm (last updated Sept. 2010). The BIA was created by the 
Attorney General in 1940 and continues to operate under the authority of the Attorney General. 
Jill E. Family, Conflicting Signals: Understanding U.S. Immigration Reform Through the 
Evolution of U.S. Immigration Law, 40 CATALAN J. PUB. L. 145, 156 (2010), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1629170. In fact, the Attorney General has 
authority to overrule BIA decisions. Id. (citing 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(h)). 
 105. Legomsky, supra note 50, at 1643. 
 106. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(2) (2006). 
 107. ALEINIKOFF ET AL., supra note 32, at 292, 1152–53. Final removal orders based on 
crime-related deportation grounds and discretionary decisions, regarding certain waivers and 
discretionary adjustments of status, are also immune from federal review. Id. Congress has also 
largely limited the immigration cases that may come before the federal courts by way of federal 
habeas corpus jurisdiction—only allowing courts to review detention when it is an issue distinct 
from the validity of a final removal order. Id. at 1180. 
  
Summer 2011] RELIEF FROM DEPORTATION 1551 
removal, outside of the federal courts’ purview.108 This limited 
opportunity for review intensifies the need for fair procedures in the 
adjudication of a noncitizen’s application for relief. 
III.  THE RELIEF STAGE OF  
REMOVAL HEARINGS:  
FUNDAMENTALLY FLAWED 
Removal hearings are undeniably adversarial, yet the hearings 
are missing the core principles of a successful adversarial system. 
While the adversarial structure of the entire removal hearing is 
deficient in this respect, the ICE attorney’s presence in establishing 
the noncitizen’s removability is arguably justified because the 
government has an interest in enforcing its immigration laws. 
However, this interest diminishes once the relief stage of the hearing 
begins. 
The current adversarial structure of the relief stage violates 
noncitizens’ right to procedural due process. When comparing the 
current shortcomings of the relief stage’s adversarial structure—lack 
of procedural safeguards and diminished government interest—to the 
noncitizen’s substantial private interest involved in applying for 
relief, it becomes clear that the current structure creates an 
unreasonable risk of erroneous deprivation. This deprivation occurs 
when ICE attorneys’ boundless cross-examinations thwart 
noncitizens’ abilities to effectively present their applications for 
relief, resulting in hearings where immigration judges are unable to 
make informed decisions on whether noncitizens’ applications 
should be granted. 
A.  The Entire Removal Hearing Lacks  
Essential Principles of a Successful Adversarial Model 
The components that are indispensable to an adversarial model’s 
proper functioning are substantially absent in removal hearings. First, 
a majority of noncitizens are unrepresented by legal counsel and, as a 
result, the hearing often lacks the contest between worthy adversaries 
that is the driving force behind the adversarial model. In 2010, 
 
 108. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i). Yet, Congress has maintained that federal courts have 
jurisdiction to review defensive asylum application appeals for abuse of discretion. Id. 
§ 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) (stating that relief under § 1158(a)—asylum—is exempted from the restriction 
on judicial review of discretionary decisions). 
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57 percent of noncitizens were unrepresented in removal hearings.109 
As a result, for a majority of noncitizens in removal proceedings, 
there is no assurance that all the pertinent facts necessary for a just 
outcome are brought to the immigration judge’s attention.110 
Also, the procedural mechanisms that level the playing field 
between the better-resourced ICE attorney and the noncitizen are 
completely lacking. The ICE attorney is not required to overcome an 
exacting burden of proof in establishing noncitizens’ removability. In 
establishing inadmissibility, the ICE attorney needs to only establish 
a prima facie case of the noncitizen’s alienage before the burden 
shifts to the noncitizen to prove that he or she was lawfully 
admitted.111 In establishing deportability, the ICE attorney is required 
to prove the alleged immigration violations by clear and convincing 
evidence for the immigration judge to find that the noncitizen is 
deportable.112 This stands in contrast to the American adversarial 
model employed in criminal proceedings, where a higher burden, 
proof beyond a reasonable doubt, is placed on the government to 
maintain a fair balance between the well-resourced government 
prosecutor and the defendant.113 
Noncitizens also have less access to the documentation that they 
need to challenge the government’s allegations and to apply for 
relief. Although noncitizens are statutorily entitled to documents and 
records pertaining to their admission or presence in the United States 
during removal hearings,114 in practice their access is limited. In 
Dent v. Holder,115 a recent Ninth Circuit case, an ICE attorney failed 
to disclose documents in Dent’s A-file supporting his claim of 
 
 109. 2010 STATISTICAL YEARBOOK, supra note 73, at G1. The number of unrepresented 
noncitizens in 2010 did not stand in isolation—from 2005 to 2009, the percent of unrepresented 
noncitizens ranged from 57 percent to 65 percent. Id. 
 110. See Finegan, supra note 6, at 473 (“When one of the parties is not represented by 
counsel . . . it is less clear who is controlling the trial.”); see also Colyer et al., supra note 43, at 
464 (“An immigration judge will be presiding, who might be sympathetic to the immigrant’s 
story, but who would benefit from an adversarial presentation. And the immigrant will often be 
standing all alone, unfamiliar with the complex web of laws . . . .”). 
 111. 8 C.F.R. § 1240.8(c). 
 112. Id. § 1240.8(a). 
 113. Doran et al., supra note 13, at 23–24. 
 114. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(2)(B) (2006). The noncitizen, however, is not entitled to these 
documents and records when the Attorney General deems them to be confidential. Id. 
 115. 627 F.3d 365 (9th Cir. 2010). 
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American citizenship by way of adoption.116 This information was 
not discovered until after the immigration judge ordered Dent 
deported,117 and it only came to light after an unusual course of 
events during Dent’s appeal process.118 
Removal hearings are also governed by relaxed rules of 
evidence119 that generally permit admission so long as the evidence is 
shown to be probative of a material issue and so long as its use 
comports with due process.120 These lax rules of evidence benefit pro 
se noncitizens in that they allow noncitizens to submit evidence 
despite their limited legal knowledge.121 Yet, this benefit is 
outweighed by the damaging impact that relaxed rules of evidence 
can have on noncitizens when it comes to the ICE attorney’s ability 
to engage in largely boundless cross-examination of noncitizens and 
their witnesses. In federal civil and criminal proceedings, strict 
evidentiary rules limit the scope of cross-examination122 and 
proscribe the manner in which the cross-examining attorney may 
impeach a witness’s credibility.123 In contrast, in removal hearings 
ICE attorneys are able to cross-examine noncitizens and other 
 
 116. Id. at 368. Dent represented himself pro se and argued that he was not removable 
because he was adopted by an American citizen when he was a child and was an American citizen 
himself. Id. 
 117. Id. at 369–70. 
 118. Id. at 370–72. In Dent, the Ninth Circuit ultimately held that the government has a duty 
to provide all noncitizens a copy of their A-file as a matter of course. Id. at 374–75. While it is 
too soon to know if full disclosure of a noncitizen’s A-file will become the norm in removal 
hearings, this holding represents progress toward providing noncitizens more due process in 
removal hearings. See Melissa Crow, Kafka Revisited: Ninth Circuit Decision Protects Due 
Process Rights for Noncitizens, IMMIGR. IMPACT (Nov. 30, 2010), http://immigrationimpact.com/ 
2010/11/30/kafka-revisited-ninth-circuit-decision-protects-due-process-rights-for-noncitizens/ 
#more-6168 (discussing the Ninth Circuit’s holding and its possible implications). 
 119. Kidane, supra note 71, at 115–18 (explaining that the evidence rules of immigration 
procedures are less stringent than both common law rules of evidence and the Federal Rules of 
Evidence). 
 120. ALEINIKOFF ET AL., supra note 32, at 1047. To illustrate, hearsay and unauthenticated 
documents are admissible unless their use is fundamentally unfair to a noncitizen. Id. 
 121. See Paris R. Baldacci, A Full and Fair Hearing: The Role of the ALJ in Assisting the Pro 
Se Litigant, 27 J. NAT’L ASS’N ADMIN. L. JUDICIARY 447, 466–67 (2007) (“Indeed, even many 
trial judges view the strict application of the rules of evidence in hearings involving pro se 
litigants as impeding a judge’s ability to do justice in such cases.”). 
 122. FED. R. EVID. 611(b) (limiting the subject matter of cross-examination to the scope of 
direct examination). 
 123. FED. R. EVID. 608, 609 (specifying what type of conduct and crimes can be used to 
impeach the witness’s character for truthfulness). 
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witnesses virtually without boundaries because of the lack of formal 
rules of evidence.124 
In sum, removal hearings lack the core components of an 
adversarial model. There is often no “sharp clash of proofs presented 
by adversaries”125 because of the high rate at which noncitizens 
appear pro se. Removal hearings also lack the highly structured 
setting, with exacting burdens of proof and strict rules of evidence, 
which is important in keeping the contest between adversaries fair.126 
B.  The Current Adversarial Structure  
Violates Noncitizens’ Procedural Due Process Rights 
The removal hearing, in its entirety, is missing essential 
adversarial principles. When it comes to contesting noncitizens’ 
applications for relief, the ICE attorney’s presence as an adversary is 
no longer necessary to fulfill the government’s enforcement 
objectives. These two deficiencies culminate during the relief stage 
to create a hearing that is inherently unfair, thereby violating 
noncitizens’ right to procedural due process.127 A basic requirement 
of procedural due process is the opportunity to be heard “at a 
meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.”128 
Since the early 1900s, the Supreme Court has recognized that 
noncitizens are entitled to due process of law in deportation 
proceedings.129 Nonetheless, most circuits—all but the Second and 
 
 124. See Kidane, supra note 71, at 136 (noting that “[t]here is virtually no limitation as to 
what questions may be asked regardless of whether they pertain to any disputed issues or not”). 
 125. LANDSMAN, supra note 8, at 2. 
 126. Id. at 4–5 (discussing the reasons behind the importance of the highly structured forensic 
procedures of the adversarial model). 
 127. The Fifth Amendment provides that the government cannot deprive a person of life, 
liberty, or property without due process of law. U.S. CONST. amend. V. The Due Process Clause 
has both a substantive and procedural element—the procedural aspect requires that the 
government follow adequate procedures in taking away a person’s life, liberty, or property. Erwin 
Chemerinsky, Procedural Due Process Claims, 16 TOURO L. REV. 871, 871 (2000). 
 128. Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965). 
 129. See Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 306 (1993) (“It is well established that the Fifth 
Amendment entitles aliens to due process of law in deportation proceedings.”); see also 
Yamataya v. Fisher, 189 U.S. 86, 100–01 (1903) (recognizing the right to procedural due process 
in deportation hearings for the first time). In contrast, the Supreme Court has held that noncitizens 
who are stopped at the border may be deported without the benefit of any type of hearing or 
procedure that affords them due process of law. See United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 
338 U.S. 537, 544 (1950) (“Whatever the procedure authorized by Congress is, it is due process 
as far as an alien denied entry is concerned.”). The Supreme Court, however, did carve out an 
exception for returning LPRs who are stopped at the border. See Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 
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Ninth—have held that the relief stage’s proceedings need not 
conform to traditional standards of fairness on the grounds that 
noncitizens have no liberty interest in discretionary forms of relief.130 
1.  The Right to Procedural Due Process  
Extends to Discretionary Applications for Relief 
In order for a noncitizen to be entitled to constitutional 
procedural due process protections in a relief hearing, he or she must 
have a valid “property” or “liberty” interest at stake.131 Whether 
someone has a protected property or liberty interest under the Due 
Process Clause is determined by whether the Constitution, a federal 
statute, or a state law has created a reasonable expectation of a 
benefit.132 Additionally, a “liberty interest may arise from the 
 
21, 33–34 (1982) (holding that a returning LPR seeking admission after a brief trip abroad was 
entitled to due process before being deported). 
  The Supreme Court has not clearly addressed how these judicial precedents apply in 
light of the shift to unitary removal hearings that focus on inadmissibility-deportability, rather 
than the traditional exclusion-deportation framework. ALEINIKOFF ET AL., supra note 32, at 613–
14; see also Legomsky, supra note 50 (explaining the shift from distinct exclusion and 
deportation hearings to a single removal hearing). In Immigration and Citizenship: Process and 
Policy, the authors posit the question of whether “clandestine border crossers” who are deemed 
inadmissible would receive due process rights under Knauff, or under the more generous due 
process analysis of Yamataya. ALEINIKOFF ET AL., supra note 32, at 614. Although the Supreme 
Court has not clearly addressed this issue, the Circuits are in agreement that due process applies 
to removal hearings, at least when it comes to establishing whether a noncitizen is inadmissible or 
deportable. See discussion infra Part III.B.1 (discussing the Circuit split over whether due process 
extends to applications for discretionary forms of relief). 
  Additionally, in 1996, Congress instated a program called expedited removal, which 
allows for border officers to deport noncitizens without providing them with a hearing or access 
to an immigration judge when the officer believes that the noncitizen is inadmissible because of 
misrepresentation or lack of proper documentation. See Family, supra note 42, at 624–27 
(discussing expedited removal procedures and the concerns that come from employing such 
removal procedures, which are subjected to almost no judicial review and limited administrative 
review); see also KANSTROOM, supra note 47, at 14–15 (discussing the government’s expansion 
of the expedited removal program to certain noncitizens who are seized in the interior of the 
United States). 
 130. Jean Pierre Espinoza, Ineffective Assistance of Counsel in Removal Proceedings Matter 
of Compean and the Fundamental Fairness Doctrine, 22 FLA. J. INT’L L. 65, 107 n.231 (2010); 
Gerald L. Neuman, Discretionary Deportation, 20 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 611, 635 (2006). However, 
Professor Gerald Neuman notes that most of the circuits that hold that procedural due process 
does not apply to discretionary forms of relief do not apply the same reasoning when dealing with 
asylum applications, even though asylum is a discretionary form of relief. Neuman, supra note 
130, at 635 n.93. 
 131. Hiroshi Motomura, The Curious Evolution of Immigration Law: Procedural Surrogates 
for Substantive Constitutional Rights, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1625, 1651–52 (1992). 
 132. See Chemerinsky, supra note 127, at 881–82. In 1972, the Supreme Court specified that 
in order to have a protectable property interest, “a person must clearly have more than an abstract 
need or desire for it” and “more than a unilateral expectation”; instead, the person must “have a 
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Constitution itself, by reason of guarantees implicit in the word 
‘liberty.’”133 If such an interest is at stake, the court will then decide 
on a case-by-case basis whether the process provided is 
constitutionally sufficient under the Due Process Clause.134 
In reaching the determination that noncitizens are not entitled to 
any type of procedural due process in the adjudication of an 
application for a discretionary form of relief, most circuits have 
concluded that there is no protected liberty or property interest in a 
discretionary application for relief.135 These circuits reason that there 
is no protected liberty or property interest at stake because of the 
discretionary nature of the relief sought. In concluding that 
suspension of deportation, a precursor to cancellation of removal, did 
not create a protectable liberty or property interest, the Fourth Circuit 
reasoned that “[a]s an illegal alien [the noncitizen] has no right to 
continue to reside in the United States,” and “eligibility for 
suspension is not a right protected by the Constitution.”136 Similarly, 
the Eighth Circuit has held that 
[c]ancellation of removal is a discretionary remedy, roughly 
equivalent to executive clemency, over which the executive 
branch has unfettered discretion. Because adjustment of 
status amounts to a power to dispense mercy, an alien can 
have no constitutionally protected liberty interest in such 
 
legitimate claim of entitlement to it.” Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972). The 
Supreme Court extended this rationale to liberty interests in Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976). 
Chemerinsky, supra note 127, at 881. In Paul v. Davis, the Supreme Court held that reputation by 
itself is not a liberty interest. 424 U.S. at 711–12. 
 133. Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 221 (2005). 
 134. Motomura, supra note 131, at 1652. Courts usually determine whether the process is 
constitutionally sufficient by analyzing the process under the three-prong balancing test 
articulated in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976). See discussion infra Part III.B.2. 
 135. Neuman, supra note 130, at 635. 
 136. Appiah v. I.N.S., 202 F.3d 704, 709 (4th Cir. 2000). Although in Appiah the Fourth 
Circuit included the fact that the noncitizen was in the United States illegally as part of its 
reasoning, the Fourth Circuit and the other circuits that hold that due process does not attach to 
applications for discretionary relief apply this holding to all noncitizens, even those with legal 
status, i.e. LPRs. Espinoza, supra note 130, at 107; see also Neuman, supra note 130, at 637 
(“Nonetheless, circuit courts that deny the relevance of procedural due process to discretionary 
relief has included relief for permanent residents in this rejection.”). However, if we follow these 
circuits’ entitlement rationale, then it does not follow that LPRs have no liberty interest at stake. 
Although LPRs are not immune from deportation, LPRs clearly have a reasonable expectation of 
a continued benefit—the benefit of continued presence in the United States created by the 
government’s grant of legal status. 
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speculative relief and cannot state a claim for a violation of 
due process rights.137 
In contrast, the Second and Ninth Circuits have held that 
noncitizens may assert a procedural due process claim in appealing a 
denial of discretionary relief.138 In reaching this conclusion, the Ninth 
Circuit did not expressly analyze whether noncitizens have a 
cognizable liberty or property interest at stake in applying for a 
discretionary form of relief. However, the Ninth Circuit implicitly 
recognized the existence of noncitizens’ liberty interest at the relief 
stage by finding that the right to procedural due process protection 
naturally extends to the entire removal hearing—including the 
application for discretionary relief.139 
The Second and Ninth Circuits’ failure to distinguish between 
the contesting-removability stage of the removal hearing and the 
relief stage correctly reflects the reality that the whole hearing 
centers on noncitizens’ liberty interest in remaining in the United 
States.140 The Supreme Court specifically articulated that even 
noncitizens who entered the country illegally may be deported only 
 
 137. Guled v. Mukasey, 515 F.3d 872, 880 (8th Cir. 2008) (internal citations omitted); see 
also Sanchez-Velasco v. Holder, 593 F.3d 733, 737 (8th Cir. 2010) (relying on Guled in holding 
that since the noncitizen lacked a protectable interest in the ultimately discretionary relief of 
cancellation of removal, his claim that the immigration judge’s actions violated his due process 
rights by excluding his witnesses and by failing to fully consider the evidence presented must 
fail); accord Jupiter v. Ashcroft, 396 F.3d 487, 492 (1st Cir. 2005); Assaad v. Ashcroft, 378 F.3d 
471, 475–76 (5th Cir. 2004); Dave v. Ashcroft, 363 F.3d 649, 652–53 (7th Cir. 2004); Nativi-
Gomez v. Ashcroft, 344 F.3d 805, 809 (8th Cir. 2003); Aguilera v. Kirkpatrick, 241 F.3d 1286, 
1292 (10th Cir. 2001); Ashki v. I.N.S., 233 F.3d 913, 920–21 (6th Cir. 2000); Mejia Rodriguez v. 
Reno, 178 F.3d 1139, 1147 (11th Cir. 1999). 
 138. See, e.g., Lopez-Umanzor v. Gonzales, 405 F.3d 1049, 1056–58 (9th Cir. 2005) (holding 
that the immigration judge’s refusal to hear testimony from the noncitizen’s experts during her 
application for cancellation of removal violated the noncitizen’s due process); Rabiu v. I.N.S., 41 
F.3d 879, 882–83 (2d Cir. 1994) (finding that the noncitizen’s counsel was prejudicially 
ineffective for failing to file his application for relief on time). 
 139. Fernandez v. Gonzales, 439 F.3d 592, 602 n.8 (9th Cir. 2006) (noting that “procedural 
due process and ineffective assistance of counsel claims, which are predicated on the right to a 
full and fair hearing are not affected by the nature of the relief sought” (internal citations 
omitted)); see also Reyes-Melendes v. I.N.S., 342 F.3d 1001, 1006, 1008 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding 
that the immigration judge violated due process by abandoning her role as a neutral fact-finder in 
adjudicating the noncitizen’s application for suspension of deportation). 
 140. Similarly, Professor Evelyn Cruz argues that the distinction between a noncitizen 
seeking relief from removal, rather than contesting removal, “is meaningless.” Cruz, supra note 
57, at 488. The interest is not a property interest in the noncitizen’s application, but “his interest 
in remaining in the country, in remaining with his family, and in continuing to pursue the 
American way of life.” Id. 
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after proceedings that comport with the standards of due process.141 
In reaching the conclusion that deportation proceedings must 
comport with due process, the Supreme Court has acknowledged that 
“deportation may deprive a man ‘of all that makes life worth 
living.’”142 This deprivation is the same regardless of whether the 
noncitizen possesses legal immigration status or not; consequently, 
all noncitizens have a liberty interest at stake during the relief stage. 
On the other hand, the majority of circuits’ reasoning in finding 
that procedural due process does not attach to applications for 
discretionary relief is unpersuasive for multiple reasons. First, in 
creating this artificial distinction between contesting the 
government’s allegations and the relief stage, the circuits ignore 
Supreme Court precedent holding that noncitizens can only be 
deported after a hearing that comports with the Due Process 
Clause.143 Such court holdings contained no qualifying language that 
such protections did not extend to the relief stage. 
Next, by focusing on the discretionary nature of the relief, the 
majority of circuits overlook what the actual due process violation 
alleged is. The circuits are correct in holding that a denial of 
discretionary relief is not itself a violation of procedural due process; 
it is that the procedures used to adjudicate the application for relief 
that are fundamentally unfair. To that end, although noncitizens do 
not have a right to discretionary relief, it does not logically follow 
that noncitizens are not entitled to a fair hearing to present their 
applications for relief.144 
Last, providing noncitizens with avenues for relief but denying 
that they have a right to a fair hearing in adjudicating an application 
for relief is contrary to common sense and debases our justice 
system. Congress has articulated what types of relief are available to 
noncitizens and under what circumstances. Immigration judges are 
 
 141. Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 212 (1953) (“It is true that 
aliens who have once passed through our gates, even illegally, may be expelled only after 
proceedings conforming to traditional standards of fairness encompassed in due process of law.”). 
 142. Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522, 530 (1954) (quoting Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U.S. 276, 
284 (1922)). 
 143. See supra note 129 and accompanying text. 
 144. See Attorney General Alberto Gonzales, Memorandum to Members of the Board of 
Immigration Appeals (Jan. 9, 2006), www.justice.gov/ag/readingroom/ag-010906-boia.pdf (“Not 
all aliens will be entitled to the relief they seek. But I insist that each case be reviewed 
proficiently and that each alien be treated with courtesy and respect.”). 
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even statutorily required to inform noncitizens of available forms of 
relief.145 Yet, in holding that the procedures employed in adjudicating 
applications for relief do not need to comport with due process, the 
circuits are frustrating Congress’s intent in providing these forms of 
relief. 
To support the holdings of the Second and Ninth Circuits in 
finding that due process does attach to the relief stage, Professor 
Gerald Neuman analogizes the relief stage to the sentencing of a 
criminal defendant.146 In this comparison, discretionary relief and 
deportation can be viewed as two ends of the sentencing spectrum 
when a noncitizen is found to be removable.147 Although the 
Supreme Court has refused to recognize that deportation is 
punishment,148 it has acknowledged the “high and momentous”149 
stakes that accompany a deportation order, along with the “drastic 
deprivations”150 that follow from deportation. Hence, the comparison 
between deportation and incarceration is not an unreasonable one to 
make—a deprivation of liberty clearly accompanies both.151 In 
holding that the sentencing process of a criminal defendant must 
comply with the requirements of the Due Process Clause, the Court 
reasoned that the “defendant has a legitimate interest in the character 
of the procedure which leads to the imposition of sentence even if he 
may have no right to object to a particular result of the sentencing 
process.”152 The Due Process Clause attaches to the sentencing 
process even in cases where the defendant pleads guilty.153 In the 
same way, when a noncitizen either contests and loses or concedes 
 
 145. See 8 C.F.R. § 1240.11(a)(2) (2010). 
 146. Neuman, supra note 130, at 636–37. 
 147. See Stumpf, supra note 71, at 1693–704 (discussing how relief from deportation creates 
the appearance of proportionality in immigration law, but that providing forms of relief fails to 
create true proportionality because there is no other sanction at issue besides deportation and 
because of the limited availability of relief). 
 148. Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 730 (1893) (holding that deportation was 
not criminal punishment); see also Legomsky, supra note 52, at 511 n.206 (detailing the 
jurisprudence that has maintained the civil label for deportation). 
 149. Delgadillo v. Carmichael, 332 U.S. 388, 391 (1947). 
 150. Woodby v. I.N.S., 385 U.S. 276, 285 (1966). 
 151. See Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 168 (1951) 
(Frankfurter, J., concurring) (“[T]he right to be heard before being condemned to suffer grievous 
loss of any kind, even though it may not involve the stigma and hardships of a criminal 
conviction, is a principle basic to our society.”). 
 152. Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 358 (1977). 
 153. See Townsend v. Burke, 334 U.S. 736, 739 (1948). 
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the government’s allegations supporting deportation, the noncitizen 
should also be entitled to procedural due process in an application for 
discretionary relief.154 
In conclusion, the reasoning of the majority of circuits in 
treating applications for discretionary relief in isolation from the rest 
of the removal hearing is incorrect. By focusing solely on the 
discretionary nature of the relief that noncitizens seek, the circuits 
have lost sight of the reality that a noncitizen’s liberty interest is at 
stake during the entire removal proceeding, from the moment an 
NTA is filed until the last appeal is exhausted. The Supreme Court 
has clearly held that the procedures used to establish a noncitizen’s 
deportability must adhere to the standards embodied in the Due 
Process Clause.155 Therefore, the procedures used in adjudicating an 
application for relief, a denial of which will also result in 
deportation, should conform to those standards as well. 
2.  The Current Adversarial Structure of the Relief  
Stage Deprives the Noncitizen of the Opportunity to Be Heard 
In Mathews v. Eldridge,156 the Court articulated three distinct 
factors to balance in determining whether the procedure is due in a 
given civil proceeding.157 These factors are: (1) the private interest 
that will be affected by the official action; (2) the government’s 
interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and 
administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural 
requirement would entail; and (3) the risk of an erroneous 
deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the 
probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural 
safeguards.158 Given the disproportionate weight of the individual’s 
interest at stake in relief hearings compared to the government’s 
minimal efficiency and enforcement interests, the current adversarial 
practices and procedures entail an unreasonable risk of erroneous 
denial of relief in violation of the Due Process Clause. 
 
 154. Neuman, supra note 130, at 637. 
 155. See supra note 129 and accompanying text. 
 156. 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976). 
 157. Id; cf. Markowitz, supra note 52, at 54 (arguing that the basic Mathews v. Eldridge test is 
insufficient in assessing whether process is due in the deportation context; instead, Professor 
Markowitz proposes a “Mathews v. Eldridge with teeth”). 
 158. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335. The Court first applied the Mathews v. Eldridge balancing 
test in the immigration context in Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 34 (1982). 
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a.  The noncitizen’s liberty interest is substantial 
When it comes to being deported, the Court has recognized that 
a noncitizen’s interest at stake is “without question, a weighty one” 
because the noncitizen stands to “lose the right to stay and live and 
work in this land of freedom” and “the right to rejoin [the 
noncitizen’s] immediate family, a right that ranks high among the 
interests of the individual.”159 This liberty interest exists during the 
relief stage to the same degree because the possible end result 
remains the same—deportation.160 
Another recent example of the private interest at stake is 
illustrated by the story of Shing Ma Li.161 Li’s parents fled China to 
avoid persecution and landed in Peru, where Li was born.162 When Li 
was eleven years old, his parents brought him and his sister to the 
United States.163 Unbeknownst to Li, his parents applied for asylum 
for the family, which was denied, but they failed to leave the 
country, as the immigration judge ordered.164 This left Li, at age 
twenty, subject to a deportation order to Peru, a country where he 
knew no one and could barely speak the language.165 Li’s liberty 
interest in applying for relief from deportation is a weighty one 
indeed. 
b.  The government’s administrative  
and enforcement interests are minimal 
The government’s interest during the relief stage is twofold—the 
EOIR has an interest in the fair, expeditious, and uniform 
administration of immigration laws,166 and ICE has an interest in 
“protect[ing] national security, public safety and the integrity of our 
 
 159. Plasencia, 459 U.S. at 34 (internal citation and quotations omitted). 
 160. See discussion supra Part III.B.1. 
 161. Jessica Kwong, Steve ‘Shing Ma’ Li Freed as Feinstein Intervenes, SFGate.com 
(Nov. 20, 2010), http://articles.sfgate.com/2010-11-20/bay-area/24842424_1_feinstein-dream-
act-private-bill. 
 162. Id. 
 163. Id. 
 164. See id. 
 165. Id. Lucky for Li, the press behind his situation was able to attract the attention of Senator 
Feinstein, who introduced a Private Bill to temporarily stay Li’s deportation to Peru. However, 
what will happen to Li after his temporary stay expires is unknown. See id. 
 166. EOIR Mission, EXEC. OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION. REVIEW, http://www.justice.gov/ 
eoir/index.html (last visited Apr. 1, 2011). 
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borders through the criminal and civil enforcement of federal law 
governing border control, customs, trade and immigration.”167 The 
current immigration court system under EOIR is hardly expeditious 
or uniform. Under the current system, the backlog of cases in the 
immigration court system is continuing to grow, with the average 
wait time being 467 days.168 Although the disparity in immigration 
judges’ asylum grant rates is declining, the disparity still pervades 
the immigration court system.169 Thus, the government does not have 
a strong argument that an adversarial structure during the relief stage 
is necessary in order to meet its adjudication goals. 
Furthermore, contesting applications for relief is not imperative 
in fulfilling the government’s enforcement objectives. Specifically, 
ICE attorneys in removal hearings are charged with “protect[ing] the 
homeland by diligently litigating cases while adhering to the highest 
standards of professional conduct . . . .”170 While the ICE attorney’s 
presence in order to establish the noncitizen’s removability is 
arguably justified by the government’s interest in protecting the 
integrity of the borders, national security, and public safety through 
enforcing immigration laws, this justification dissipates once the 
relief stage commences. The justification ceases because the focus of 
the relief stage is about granting mercy,171 not whether immigration 
laws have been violated. 
i.  The government’s diminished interest in  
protecting the integrity of the United States’ borders 
ICE’s concentration on the enforcement of immigration laws in 
the interior of the United States is an important component in 
 
 167. STRATEGIC PLAN FY 2010–2014, U.S. IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT 2 
(2010), available at http://www.ice.gov/news/releases/1006/100630washingtondc.htm. 
 168. Immigration Case Backlog Still Growing in FY 2011, TRANSACTIONAL RECORDS 
ACCESS CLEARINGHOUSE, http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/246/ (last updated Feb. 7, 
2011). 
 169. Latest Data from Immigration Courts Show Decline in Asylum Disparity, 
TRANSACTIONAL RECORDS ACCESS CLEARINGHOUSE, http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/ 
209/ (last updated June 22, 2009); see also Jaya Ramji-Nogales et al., Refugee Roulette: 
Disparities in Asylum Adjudications, 60 STAN. L. REV. 295, 328–49 (2007) (discussing the 
disparities in asylum grant rates among immigration courts and immigration judges, and the 
relationship between different factors, such as the immigration judge’s gender). 
 170. About the Office of the Principal Legal Advisor, U.S. IMMIGRATION & CUSTOMS 
ENFORCEMENT, http://www.ice.gov/about/offices/leadership/opla/ (last visited Apr. 1, 2011). 
 171. See Guled v. Mukasey, 515 F.3d 872, 880 (8th Cir. 2008). 
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protecting the security of the United States’ borders.172 The ICE 
attorney fulfills this duty once the ICE attorney successfully 
establishes a noncitizen’s removability. In contrast, when it comes to 
contesting noncitizens’ applications for relief, the ICE attorney is no 
longer advocating a position that ensures the protection of the 
country’s borders. For example, in contesting asylum applications, 
the ICE attorney may take the stance that the noncitizen is not 
credible and is telling a fictitious story, or that the persecution that 
the noncitizen suffers or fears is not substantial enough for the 
immigration judge to find that the noncitizen qualifies for asylum. 
Neither of these arguments is related to the noncitizen’s unlawful 
presence in the country, and thus, in arguing against asylum, the ICE 
attorney is not protecting the integrity of the country’s borders. 
On the other hand, to this point may be that in contesting 
fraudulent applications for asylum, ICE attorneys are protecting the 
integrity of our borders. Yet, in practice, the perception of 
practitioners and scholars is that ICE attorneys contest most 
applications for relief without any regard to the merits of the 
noncitizen’s application, and consequently, are not really ensuring 
that our immigration laws are being properly applied. To illustrate, in 
removal hearings, “the government’s objective can seem to be defeat 
through any method, without considering the merits of the case,” and 
the “perception is that the government views a victory as a denial of 
relief accompanied by a removal order (i.e. ‘guilty’).”173 By 
presuming that a majority of asylum claims are fraudulent claims, 
ICE attorneys’ aggressive oppositional stance burdens honest 
applicants by making it more difficult for them to present truthful 
accounts of their asylum claims to the immigration judge, which, in 
turn, affirmatively frustrates the intent of Congress in providing 
 
 172. See Bennie G. Thompson, A Legislative Prescription for Confronting 21st-Century Risks 
to the Homeland, 47 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 277, 310 (2010). CBP is the branch of DHS that is 
responsible for protecting America’s borders at official points of entry. Id. 
 173. Family, supra note 81; see also Armen H. Merjian, A Guinean Refugee’s Odyssey: In Re 
Jarno, The Biggest Asylum Case in U.S. History and What It Tells Us About Our Broken System, 
23 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 649, 668 (2009) (“In practice, however, and particularly since 9/11, INS 
lawyers have assumed fully adversarial roles, fighting asylum claims vigorously, regardless of 
their merit. ‘Before 9/11, we used to be able to negotiate with INS, and work something out in a 
case like this,’ said one member of [the noncitizen’s] legal team, ‘but post-9/11, their lawyers try 
to cream you.’”). 
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asylum as a form of relief to those who have suffered persecution.174 
It also undermines the immigration judge’s ability to make an 
informed decision regarding whether asylum should be granted. 
Similarly, when it comes to an application for cancellation of 
removal, the noncitizen has already entered the United States, either 
lawfully or unlawfully. Again, the dispute is not over whether that 
entrance was lawful but whether the noncitizen should now be 
entitled to remain in the country.175 Accordingly, contesting the 
noncitizen’s application for cancellation is unrelated to protecting the 
integrity of our borders. 
ii.  The government’s diminished interest  
in protecting national security and public safety 
In protecting national security and public safety, ICE 
concentrates on investigating and removing noncitizens who present 
a risk to the community, including terrorists, gang members, and 
convicted criminals.176 If the noncitizen is part of a terrorist 
organization or has been convicted of certain enumerated crimes, 
then the immigration judge might initially determine that the 
noncitizen is removable.177 Thus, once the ICE attorney establishes 
that the noncitizen is deportable on criminal or national security 
grounds, the ICE attorney has fulfilled his or her duty to protect the 
homeland.178 
 
 174. See HUTCHINSON, supra note 69, at 521 (noting that in providing asylum as a form of 
relief, Congress has “no doubt been moved by various considerations, political and national as 
well as humanitarian, but [has] consistently shown sympathy for the unfortunate and a sense of 
obligation to preserve the national image and provide a haven of refuge for the oppressed”). 
 175. See discussion supra Part II.C.2.b.ii. 
 176. STRATEGIC PLAN FY 2010–2014, supra note 167, at 6. 
 177. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2), (3) (2006) (providing the criminal and security related 
offenses that make someone inadmissible); Id. § 1227(a)(2), (4) (same, but for deportable 
noncitizens). 
 178. Yet, it is not always clear that ICE attorneys are targeting noncitizens who actually pose 
a threat to the United States’s national security and public safety. See APPLESEED, Chapter 4: 
Empowering DHS Trial Attorneys to Handle Cases More Efficiently in ASSEMBLY LINE 
INJUSTICE: BLUE PRINT TO REFORM AMERICA’S IMMIGRATION COURTS 16 (2009), available at 
http://appleseednetwork.org/bOurProjectsb/ImmigrantRights/CourtReform/tabid/596/ 
Default.aspx [hereinafter Empowering DHS Trial Attorneys] (reporting that one practitioner 
interviewed had observed an ICE attorney argue that a noncitizen should be deported because he 
“provided ‘material support’ to terrorists, a group of Burundi rebels, based solely on the fact that 
the rebels robbed him of $4.12 and his lunch”); see also Andrea Guttin, The Criminal Alien 
Program: Immigration Enforcement in Travis County, Texas, IMMIGRATION POLICY CTR. (Feb. 
2010), http://www.immigrationpolicy.org/special-reports/criminal-alien-program-immigration-
enforcement-travis-county-texas (last visited Mar. 1, 2011) (concluding that the Criminal Alien 
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A criminal conviction will often automatically bar a noncitizen 
from qualifying for a form of relief. Yet, the argument that the ICE 
attorney is protecting the homeland by contesting applications based 
on a noncitizen’s prior criminal conviction falls short because the 
ICE attorney’s presence is not necessary to establish the existence of 
the criminal conviction. The ICE attorney merely needs to submit the 
noncitizen’s record of conviction, or similar official court 
documentation, to the immigration judge.179 For example, a 
conviction for an aggravated felony180 can disqualify a noncitizen 
from applying for asylum181 and cancel removal.182 
The term aggravated felony is unique to the INA,183 and, as a 
result, it is not always clear whether a state conviction qualifies as an 
aggravated felony for immigration purposes. In order to qualify as an 
aggravated felony, the conduct prohibited by state law must be 
punishable as a felony under federal law.184 Whether a noncitizen’s 
past criminal conviction qualifies as an aggravated felony may not be 
as easily discernible when there is not perfect overlap between the 
state and federal offenses. To illustrate, a noncitizen may have been 
convicted of cocaine possession in state court, but the record of 
conviction might not include whether the crime involved more than 
five grams of crack cocaine, which is necessary for a federal court to 
consider it an aggravated felony.185 Yet, even in contested situations, 
 
Program, which prioritizes deportation of noncitizens convicted of crimes, “has not fulfilled its 
mission of enhancing public safety,” and rather than limiting its focus to noncitizens convicted of 
violent crimes, the program identified a majority of noncitizens who “are people who were 
arrested for mere misdemeanor violations”). 
 179. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(3)(B) (listing the documents or records that can constitute proof 
of a criminal conviction); see also ALEINIKOFF ET AL., supra note 32, at 775 (explaining that the 
record of conviction cannot be collaterally attacked in immigration court). 
 180. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43) (listing the categories of criminal offenses that qualify as 
aggravated felonies); Legomsky, supra note 52, at 483–86 (discussing the expansion of the list of 
crimes that now qualify as aggravated felonies). 
 181. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(2)(A)(ii) (stating that a conviction of a particularly serious crime will 
make the noncitizen ineligible for asylum). Section (b)(2)(B)(i) of this same provision provides 
that a noncitizen “who has been convicted of an aggravated felony shall be considered to have 
been convicted of a particularly serious crime.” Id. § 1158(b)(2)(B)(i). 
 182. Id. §§ 1229b(a)(3), (b)(1)(C) (providing that a conviction of an aggravated felony will 
make both LPRs and non-LPRs ineligible for cancellation of removal). 
 183. Carachuri-Rosendo v. Holder, 130 S. Ct. 2577, 2585 (2010). 
 184. Id. at 2589. 
 185. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(B) (providing that “[t]he term ‘aggravated felony’ means . . . 
illicit trafficking in a controlled substance (as defined in section 802 of Title 21), including a drug 
trafficking crime (as defined in section 924(c) of Title 18)”). A conviction for possession of more 
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the ICE attorney’s presence is not necessary because the ICE 
attorney is unable to go outside the record of conviction in trying to 
establish that the noncitizen’s prior conviction is an aggravated 
felony.186 For this reason, since the immigration judge’s 
determination will rest on the documentation that the ICE attorney 
presents and the immigration judge’s interpretation of such 
documentation, the ICE attorney’s presence is not necessary to 
effectuate the government’s enforcement goals. 
c.  ICE attorney practices and the lack of procedural  
safeguards produce an unreasonable risk that the  
immigration judge will deny an application for relief 
 based on incomplete or inaccurate information 
The current adversarial procedures create a risk that noncitizens 
will be erroneously deprived of the opportunity to effectively present 
their applications for relief because ICE attorneys are allowed to 
cross-examine noncitizens without the procedural safeguards 
commonly found in adversarial systems. Such a risk is unreasonable 
in light of the high personal interest that is at stake in applying for 
relief and the lack of justifiable government interest in contesting 
applications for relief. 
While there is nothing wrong per se with the ICE attorney using 
cross-examination as a tool to test a noncitizen’s credibility, the 
mode and scope of cross-examination in an adversarial system is 
usually limited by formal rules of evidence that are not present in 
 
than five grams of crack cocaine is punishable pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 924(c), and therefore 
amounts to an aggravated felony. 
 186. See Carachuri-Rosendo, 130 S.Ct. at 2586 (rejecting the “hypothetical approach” for 
determining whether a state conviction qualifies as an aggravated felony because such an 
approach “would treat all ‘conduct punishable as a felony’ as the equivalent of a ‘conviction’ of a 
felony whenever, hypothetically speaking, the underlying conduct could have received felony 
treatment under federal law”). Although the Supreme Court in Carachuri-Rosendo narrowed its 
holding to situations involving subsequent simple possession offenses and recidivist possession 
statutes, the Court did make clear that  
[t]he mere possibility that the defendant’s conduct, coupled with facts outside of the 
record of conviction, could have authorized a felony conviction under federal law is 
insufficient to satisfy the statutory command that a noncitizen be ‘convicted of a[n] 
aggravated felony’ before he loses the opportunity to seek cancellation of removal. 
Id. at 2589. 
  
Summer 2011] RELIEF FROM DEPORTATION 1567 
removal hearings.187 Similar formal rules are absent in removal 
hearings, despite the fact that the same considerations that compel 
the evidentiary restrictions on cross-examination in federal civil and 
criminal proceedings exist in removal hearings.188 Due to the lack of 
rules restricting the form and scope of the ICE attorney’s cross-
examination, the ICE attorney may impeach the noncitizen’s 
testimony on irrelevant, and what might otherwise be considered 
impermissible, grounds, which can mislead the immigration judge 
and prevent the basis of the noncitizen’s applications from coming to 
light. 
This risk is amplified during the relief stage because noncitizens 
applying for relief often have no choice but to testify on their own 
behalf. For instance, noncitizens often do not have concrete proof to 
support their asylum claims because of the circumstances in which 
noncitizens usually flee their country.189 Also, the noncitizen’s 
testimony is ordinarily the most persuasive evidence supporting the 
application for relief. In addition, if a noncitizen chooses to not 
testify, an immigration judge may draw a negative inference from the 
noncitizen’s silence.190 
One study reported that in impeaching the noncitizen’s 
credibility, the ICE attorney usually focused the cross-examination 
on disparaging the noncitizen’s moral character, rather than on the 
merits of the noncitizen’s asylum claim.191 For example, in one 
application for asylum, the ICE attorney centered the cross-
examination on why the noncitizen had left his children behind and 
had not married his children’s mother, rather than on the basis for the 
noncitizen’s asylum claim.192 Conversely, if rules similar to the 
Federal Rules of Evidence were in place, the ICE attorney would not 
 
 187. For example, in the federal judiciary, Rules 607, 608, 609, 611, and 613 of the Federal 
Rules of Evidence dictate how a witness may be cross-examined. THOMAS A. MAUET & 
WARREN D. WOLFSON, TRIAL EVIDENCE 357–412 (Aspen Publishers, 4th ed. 2009). 
 188. Kidane, supra note 71, at 136–37. 
 189. See supra notes 79–80 and accompanying text. 
 190. United States ex rel. Bilokumsky v. Tod, 263 U.S. 149, 153–54 (1923) (“Conduct which 
forms a basis for inference is evidence. Silence is often evidence of the most persuasive 
character.”). However, silence on its own is insufficient to meet the government’s burden in 
establishing deportability. See Matter of Guevara, 20 I. & N. Dec. 238, 242 (1991). In contrast, in 
the American adversarial criminal justice system, the trier of fact may not make a negative 
inference if the defendant chooses to invoke the right to remain silent. 
 191. Anker, supra note 83, at 493. 
 192. Id. at 493–94; FED. R. EVID. 402. 
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have been able to pursue this line of questioning because it would 
have been improper impeachment evidence since the noncitizen’s 
relationship with the mother of his children did not bear on his 
character for truthfulness,193 nor was it relevant to his asylum 
claim.194 
Professor David A. Martin credits this “impoverished” cross-
examination to ICE attorneys’ lack of preparation time due to heavy 
caseloads and lack of resources.195 Professor Martin argues that, as a 
result of these factors, the ICE attorney will not know what type of 
case is before him or her until well into the proceeding, and, as a 
result, he or she cross-examines without regard to the merits of the 
asylum application.196 In spite of what may be an understandable 
explanation of the ICE attorney’s disregard for the underlying merits 
of a noncitizen’s application for asylum, the ICE attorney’s aimless 
and boundless cross-examination—in contesting the noncitizen’s 
application for asylum without investigating whether the claim is 
colorable—unjustly thwarts the noncitizen’s ability to effectively 
present his or her application for relief. 
Problems associated with the ICE attorney’s cross-examination 
are further exacerbated when the noncitizen is unrepresented by 
counsel. When competent counsel is present, the noncitizen’s 
counsel may prepare the noncitizen for aggressive cross-examination 
before the hearing, object to the ICE attorney’s irrelevant or 
improper questions, or rehabilitate the noncitizen’s testimony by 
asking questions on redirect examination to explain inconsistencies 
that were exposed during the cross-examination.197 
According to the Supreme Court, “[t]he opportunity to be heard 
must be tailored to the capacities and circumstances of those who are 
to be heard.”198 A removal hearing often features a noncitizen who is 
unfamiliar with American jurisprudence, who does not speak the 
English language, and, most importantly, who is unrepresented by 
 
 193. See FED. R. EVID. 608, 609(a)(2). 
 194. See FED. R. EVID. 402 (providing that evidence that is not relevant is not admissible). 
 195. Martin, supra note 72, at 1308; see also Empowering DHS Trial Attorneys, supra note 
178, at 16 (reporting that, according to ICE, in 2005, ICE trial attorneys only had twenty minutes 
to prepare for each case). 
 196. Martin, supra note 72, at 1309. 
 197. See MAUET & WOLFSON, supra note 187, at 413–15 (discussing the law and practice of 
redirect examination during a trial). 
 198. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 268–69 (1969). 
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trained legal counsel. The noncitizen must then face an aggressive 
adversary, the ICE attorney, in applying for a form of relief. The 
result? An adversarial hearing that is not tailored to the capacities 
and circumstances of the noncitizens. It is an adversarial hearing that, 
in fact, creates the risk that noncitizens will be deprived of the 
opportunity to effectively present their applications for relief to 
immigration judges, which causes the immigration judges to make 
uninformed decisions regarding the applications. 
IV.  PROPOSAL:  
APPLICATIONS FOR RELIEF  
SHOULD BE NONADVERSARIAL 
The current adversarial structure of the relief stage cannot 
continue to exist as it does. Some proponents of immigration court 
reform advocate that adopting stricter rules of evidence would 
restore integrity to the immigration court system.199 Yet, strict rules 
of evidence without counsel would do little to assist noncitizens in 
presenting their applications for relief.200 However, providing 
government-appointed counsel to all noncitizens in removal hearings 
is not a realistic solution, given the large administrative and financial 
burden in making such a shift. Furthermore, some scholars speculate 
whether providing government appointed counsel to indigent 
litigants is the best way to increase those litigants’ access to 
justice.201 
Despite the American preference for adversarial justice, the 
adversarial model is not always the most appropriate means of 
 
 199. See Kidane, supra note 71 (arguing that adopting appropriate rules of procedure and 
evidence mirrored after the Federal Rules of Evidence could ensure consistency, credibility, and 
predictability of deportation proceedings); see also Stacy Caplow, ReNorming Immigration 
Court, 13 NEXUS 85, 94–95 (2007–2008) (advocating for standardized rules of evidence within 
the immigration courts). 
 200. See Baldacci, supra note 121, at 447–48 (noting that “our lawyer-based adversarial 
litigation regime . . . is bound—some might say hidebound—by formal rules of evidence and 
procedure that effectively require representation by lawyers both for access to its promise of a fair 
and impartial resolution of disputes and to be able to navigate its shoals”). 
 201. See Pearce, supra note 7, at 974–78 (arguing that access to lawyers will never solve the 
problem of unequal justice; rather, attention should focus on judges’ ability to equalize justice 
and redress the failures of the market for justice); see also Benjamin H. Barton, Against Civil 
Gideon (And for Pro Se Court Reform), 62 FLA. L. REV. 1227, 1250–62 (2010) (arguing that civil 
Gideon will not ameliorate the execrable state of pro se litigation for the poor in the United 
States). 
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adjudicating certain types of claims.202 For instance, the main 
determination during the relief stage involves whether the noncitizen 
deserves the relief that he or she seeks. This type of determination is 
better suited for an inquisitorial system aimed at finding the absolute 
truth—a full account of what happened based on an evaluation of all 
the evidence available—rather than for the adversarial model, which 
seeks a pragmatic truth, “the best truth that it can get under the 
circumstances.”203 Shifting to a nonadversarial inquisitorial format at 
the relief stage, while apparently radical, would address the 
deficiencies of the current adversarial structure of the relief stage 
without putting an undue financial or administrative burden on the 
government. 
A.  The Nonadversarial Structure of the Relief Stage 
The portion of the removal hearing in which the ICE attorney is 
charged with establishing the noncitizen’s removability will remain 
unchanged—the ICE attorney will still be responsible for 
establishing the noncitizen’s inadmissibility or deportability. This 
will allow the ICE attorney to continue to fulfill the government’s 
enforcement objectives. However, once the noncitizen concedes the 
government’s allegations or the ICE attorney succeeds in proving 
that the noncitizen is removable, the ICE attorney’s active role in the 
proceedings will terminate. The ICE attorney will not be present at 
the relief stage of the removal hearing. 
At the outset of the removal hearing, the ICE attorney will be 
required to provide both the immigration judge and the noncitizen 
with a copy of the noncitizen’s A-file. Although the ICE attorney is 
already required to provide the A-file to the noncitizen on request, 
the ICE attorney does not always do so.204 Providing the immigration 
judge with the noncitizen’s A-file at the start of the hearing would 
 
 202. See ALEINIKOFF ET AL., supra note 32, at 1036 (posing the question of whether part of 
the problem with removal proceedings is the Anglo-American preference for adversarial, lawyer-
centered proceedings); see also Friendly, supra note 1, at 1289 (suggesting that it might be better 
to abandon the adversary system in certain areas of mass justice). 
 203. Matthew T. King, Security, Scale, Form and Function: The Search for Truth and the 
Exclusion of Evidence in Adversarial and Inquisitorial Justice Systems, 12 INT’L LEGAL PERSP. 
185, 188–89 (2002) (explaining how the justification for allowing party control in the adversarial 
system versus state control in the inquisitorial system depends on the mode of truth-seeking that 
each model aims to discover). 
 204. See supra notes 113–17 and accompanying text. 
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change the current structure, but it is vital to the immigration judge 
embracing his role as an inquisitorial judge. Once removability is 
established, the ICE attorney may also provide the immigration judge 
with any additional documentation or information pertinent to the 
noncitizen’s application for relief, such as names of witnesses who 
the immigration judge may wish to subpoena or the noncitizen’s 
criminal record. This way, the immigration judge will be well 
equipped to elicit the important information from the noncitizen and 
witnesses in making the ultimate determination of whether to grant 
the noncitizen’s requested relief. The A-file and additional 
documentation would satisfy the same function as the dossier does in 
the French inquisitorial system.205 
During the master calendar hearing, or after the noncitizen’s 
removability is established, the immigration judge will then provide 
the noncitizen with information about possible forms of relief and 
advise the noncitizen on securing that relief, as is already the 
immigration judge’s duty.206 The noncitizen will then have time to 
fill out the necessary forms for the application for relief and gather 
evidence from witnesses, as is also currently the process. The only 
change occurs during the actual hearing regarding the noncitizen’s 
application for relief. The immigration judge, instead of an ICE 
attorney, will question the noncitizen. The immigration judge must 
be conscious not to assume the role of an adversarial opponent, but 
he or she must ask the questions necessary to reach a decision. Yet, 
even if the immigration judge engages in aggressive questioning 
similar to that of an ICE attorney, a nonadversarial structure will still 
decrease the probability that the noncitizen will be unable to 
effectively present his or her application for relief because at least 
the noncitizen will only be facing one “adversary,” rather than two—
the ICE attorney and the immigration judge.207 
The noncitizen would still have the right to be represented by 
counsel in a nonadversarial hearing. The role of the noncitizen’s 
counsel would not alter the proceedings substantially, however. 
Instead of the immigration judge taking the lead in questioning the 
 
 205. See supra notes 15–17 and accompanying text. 
 206. See supra note 61 and accompanying text. 
 207. See Anker, supra note 83, at 489 (discussing how the perception arose in asylum 
adjudications in immigration courts that the noncitizen faced two prosecutors, instead of one). 
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noncitizen, the noncitizen’s counsel will begin the questioning, 
allowing the immigration judge to further inquire into areas that were 
not thoroughly explored. 
In order to facilitate a nonadversarial environment while 
questioning the noncitizen and witnesses, the immigration judge 
should receive training in human rights law and national and 
international refugee law and principles, which are already statutorily 
required for asylum officers who hear affirmative asylum claims.208 
Being versed in these subjects, along with receiving training in 
questioning noncitizens in a nonadversarial fashion,209 will help the 
immigration judge stay neutral while he or she questions the 
noncitizen. In addition to questioning the noncitizen, the immigration 
judge should allow the noncitizen to tell his or her narrative without 
interruption, and, when asking questions of the noncitizen, the 
immigration judge should adopt a manner that assists the noncitizen 
in relating his or her narrative.210 This will allow the noncitizen to 
more effectively present his or her claims for relief, which, in turn, 
will provide the immigration judge with better information in making 
a determination of whether the noncitizen should be entitled to a 
grant of relief. The inquisitorial role of the immigration judge also 
comports with immigration judges’ existing duty to develop a full 
record.211 
An inquisitorial immigration judge will be well equipped to 
handle any burden-shifting that exists in the current adversarial 
structure of the relief stage because ICE attorneys largely rely on 
documentation in sustaining their burden. For example, in defensive 
asylum applications, if the noncitizen succeeds in persuading the 
 
 208. See supra note 77 and accompanying text. 
 209. See, e.g., Daniel Forman, Improving Asylum-Seeker Credibility Determinations: 
Introducing Appropriate Dispute Resolution Techniques into the Process, 16 CARDOZO J. INT’L 
& COMP. L. 207, 237–38 (2008) (suggesting that training immigration judges to ask questions by 
using active listening or looping techniques will provide immigration judges with a better 
understanding of whether the noncitizen has a viable claim for relief and will provide the 
noncitizens with a better platform to convey applications for relief to immigration judges). 
 210. See Baldacci, supra note 121, at 476–79 (discussing how ALJs can assist pro se litigants 
in structuring and developing their narratives so that their legal adequacy can be articulated and 
evaluated, and discussing the benefits associated with adopting such a practice). 
 211. See Martin, supra note 72, at 1349 (explaining why the author thinks that all asylum 
adjudications should move to a nonadversarial structure, and commenting that “[i]t could hardly 
be thought unfair to the applicant to replace such interrogation (designedly adverse) with 
questioning done instead by an examiner who has been instructed that her role is to develop a full 
record and not to strive zealously for a negative outcome”). 
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court that he or she was subjected to past persecution, the burden 
shifts to the government to show that country conditions have 
changed.212 However, in the nonadversarial hearing, instead of 
relying on the ICE attorney to present country conditions, the 
immigration judge can turn to State Department reports, credible 
news sources, and other reliable and verifiable authorities in 
international law. In his 1990 proposal for a nonadversarial asylum 
adjudication system for all asylum applications, Professor Martin 
noted that adversarial tools are not of great assistance to the 
immigration judge in determining country conditions because that 
information is usually documentary.213 For the same reasons, an 
immigration judge will be able to address whether a noncitizen’s 
criminal conviction qualifies as an aggravated felony that bars him or 
her from satisfying the eligibility criteria for cancellation of removal 
without an adversarial presentation, since the ICE attorney normally 
relies on documentary evidence.214 
In conclusion, a nonadversarial relief stage would afford 
noncitizens the opportunity to be heard in a manner tailored to the 
noncitizens’ capacities and circumstances,215 without drastically 
altering the current immigration court system. 
B.  Shifting to a Nonadversarial Structure  
Would Not Place an Undue Financial or  
Administrative Burden on the Government 
The Supreme Court has noted that in order to ensure fairness in 
the immigration context, the hearing “must provide [the noncitizen] 
an opportunity to present her case effectively, though at the same 
time it cannot impose an undue burden on the Government.”216 
Shifting to a nonadversarial structure in adjudicating applications for 
relief would, at worst, place only a slight burden on the government, 
and could potentially result in substantial benefits. Requiring the ICE 
attorney’s presence only to establish the noncitizen’s removability 
would decrease the role of ICE attorneys and might mean that ICE 
attorneys could handle larger caseloads or manage their current 
 
 212. See discussion supra Part II.C.2.b.i. 
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caseloads more efficiently. Investing the immigration judge with 
inquisitorial responsibilities in adjudicating applications for relief 
will, however, likely increase the time that an immigration judge 
spends on such applications, adding to immigration judges’ already 
overwhelming workload.217 There are two solutions in dealing with 
this increased workload—hire more immigration judges and hire 
more support staff, in particular, more law clerks. 
The need for more law clerks and immigration judges already 
exists, and it would not be a new phenomenon if the application-for-
relief stage of the removal hearing were shifted to a nonadversarial 
structure.218 The government is also already making efforts to 
increase the number of immigration judges and law clerks.219 Since 
there is already a need for more immigration judges and law clerks, 
the additional burden of having the immigration judge assume an 
inquisitorial role would just increase the already existing need, but it 
would not create an undue burden on the government. Furthermore, 
since the EOIR and ICE are both under the DOJ, money saved from 
reducing the role of ICE attorneys could be shifted to hiring more 
immigration judges and law clerks. 
Moreover, removing the ICE attorney from the application-for-
relief stage of the removal hearing may increase the efficiency of the 
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proceeding. Allowing immigration judges, rather than ICE attorneys, 
to shape the issues permits immigration judges to spend time on the 
issues that they know will be important to their ultimate 
determination. This may serve to offset some of the additional time 
that the immigration judge will need to spend becoming familiar with 
a particular application for relief. Altogether, the shift to a 
nonadversarial structure will not be a substantial financial burden on 
the government. 
Also, removing the ICE attorney from the application-for-relief 
portion of the removal hearing will not substantially alter the 
administrative structure. Shifting to a nonadversarial structure would 
not require the development of a new state actor or a new position 
within the immigration court. It would, however, require further 
education for immigration judges on how to appropriately and 
effectively embrace the inquisitorial role. This may require the EOIR 
to hold more training sessions in order to shift to a nonadversarial 
structure, but, overall, the shift would not create a substantial 
administrative burden for the government. 
Additionally, the nonadversarial structure could be implemented 
without congressional action, avoiding the accompanying 
administrative hassle and delay. Since ICE attorneys are not 
statutorily required to be present during the relief stage220 and 
immigration judges already have authority to act as inquisitorial 
judges,221 ICE could issue a department memorandum mandating that 
once removability is established, the ICE attorney’s role ceases.222 
C.  Does Shifting to a Nonadversarial Structure  
Put Too Much Power in the Hands of Immigration Judges? 
Circuit judges, practitioners, and advocates have criticized 
immigration judges for adjudicating cases without regard to the 
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merits of the cases or the evidence presented, and for treating 
noncitizens disrespectfully.223 That immigration judges have a 
reputation for being biased against noncitizens, coupled with the 
inaccurate assumption that judges who assume an inquisitorial role 
lose impartiality,224 may cause some advocates to be apprehensive 
about shifting to a nonadversarial relief stage. Noncitizens’ 
advocates may also be concerned that immigration judges will 
merely adopt the “deport-in-all-cases” philosophy among ICE 
attorneys225 if the ICE attorney is removed from the relief stage. 
Some advocates attribute immigration judges’ bias against 
noncitizens to a lack of independence due to politicized hiring 
processes and political pressures and to the notion that that some 
immigration judges are just not well suited for the position.226 
Immigration judges are appointed by the Attorney General and are 
employees of the DOJ.227 Consequently, the Attorney General holds 
great power over the immigration judges, which can create a conflict 
of interest and put pressure on the immigration judges to rule in favor 
of the government.228 There are also certain immigration judges who 
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are known to be particularly harsh toward noncitizens and who pride 
themselves on the number of removals that they order each year.229 
Yet encouraging the current immigration judges to assume a 
more inquisitorial role does not increase the risk that noncitizens’ 
applications for relief will be unfairly adjudicated because doing so 
does not provide unfair and unethical immigration judges with more 
authority than they already possess to remove noncitizens. Moreover, 
encouraging the inquisitorial authority of immigration judges does 
not require fair and ethical immigration judges to lose their 
neutrality.230 The BIA has even noted that the special inquiry officer, 
the immigration judge’s predecessor, did “not cease to be impartial 
[in a deportation proceeding] merely because, in his quest for the 
truth, he s[ought] to clarify the record by calling the attention of the 
trial attorney to certain areas of inquiry not yet developed.”231 
Another check on immigration judges will be possible if the 
other circuits follow the lead of the Second and Ninth Circuits in 
holding that procedural due process attaches to an application for 
discretionary relief.232 If this occurs, then the circuits will be able to 
review whether procedures in adjudicating the application for relief 
conformed with the Due Process Clause, even though the circuits 
will be precluded from reviewing the immigration judge’s 
discretionary decision itself.233 For example, if review is allowed, the 
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circuits will be able to provide a check to ensure that immigration 
judges’ determinations are not the result of bias or prejudgment.234 
V.  CONCLUSION 
Shifting to a nonadversarial structure in adjudicating 
noncitizens’ applications for relief from deportation is just one step 
toward achieving an immigration adjudication system that strikes the 
right balance between enforcing immigration laws and providing 
noncitizens with a fair opportunity to present their applications for 
relief. Advocating for a nonadversarial relief hearing may sound like 
a radical proposal. But implementing such a change would not 
drastically alter the landscape of removal hearings. ICE attorneys 
would retain their central role in establishing noncitizens’ 
inadmissibility or deportability, and immigration judges would still 
have the duty to inform noncitizens of available forms of relief and 
to develop a full record. Yet, with ICE attorneys removed as 
aggressive adversaries and immigration judges encouraged to 
embrace their statutorily permitted inquisitorial role rather than shy 
from it, noncitizens will be able to present their applications for relief 
in a hearing that comports with the traditional standards of fairness 
that are encompassed in the Due Process Clause. 
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